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1	
Institutional Purposes of Chinese Courts1: Examining Judicial Guiding Cases in China 
through A New Analytic Framework 
1. Introduction
In recent years, empirical lights start to shine upon the dormant studies of authoritarian courts. 
For example, Ginsburg and Moustafa has identified several functions authoritarian courts 
delivering to the regime and constraints imposed by authoritarian regimes2. In addition, there 
are also a few pilot studies drawing empirical data from People’s Republic of China (PRC) 
courts to test general hypotheses of judicial studies in authoritarian contexts3.  On the other 
hand, existing literature of Chinese judicial studies are quite fruitful4. However, existing 
literature on Chinese Legal Studies are largely insufficient to provide a comprehensive 
theoretical framework for understanding how PRC courts, as institutions, evolve in China’s 
authoritarian context. Likewise, for global judicial studies, although genuinely insightful, 
they also failed to answer a similar question: apart from being “active servant” of the 
1	By	 “context”,	we	 follow	 the	 contextualism	which	 tended	 to	 subordinate	 political	 phenomena	 to	 contextual	 phenomena	 such	 as	economic	 growth,	 class	 structure,	 and	 socioeconomic	 cleavages.	 Simply	 put,	 contextualism	means	 politics	 and	 the	 state	 largely	depend	 on	 society	 its	 operated.	 James	 March	 &	 Johan	 Olsen,	 “The	 New	 Institutionalism:	 Organizational	 Factors	 in	 Political	Life”(1984)	734	at	735	2These	 functions	 include	 but	 not	 limit	 to	 exerting	 social	 control,	 increasing	 legal	 legitimacy,	 strengthening	 administrative	compliance	within	the	bureaucracy,	facilitating	trade	and	investment,	and	implementing	controversial	policies.	Equal	importantly,	given	 that	 authoritarian	 courts	 are	 “double-edged	 sword”,	 there	 are	 also	 several	 common	 strategies	 for	 authoritarian	 regimes	containing	courts:	promoting	judicial	self-restraint,	engineering	fragmented	judicial	systems,	constraining	the	access	to	justice,	and	incapacitating	 judicial	 support	 networks.	 Although	 not	 all	 these	 functions	 and	 constraining	 strategies	 equally	 apply	 to	 every	authoritarian	 (including	 PRC)	 court,	 at	 least	 some	of	 them	are	 in	 common.	 Tom	Ginsburg	&	Tamir	Moustafa,	 “Introduction:	 The	Functions	 of	 Courts	 in	 Authoritarian	 Politics”	 in	 Tom	 Ginsburg	 &	 Tamir	 Moustafa,	 eds,	 Rule	 by	 Law,	 The	 Politics	 of	 Courts	 in	
Authoritarian	Regimes	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2008)	1	at	4,	14-21	3	These	 include	Tom	Ginsburg,	 “Administrative	 Law	 and	 the	 Judicial	 Control	 of	 Agents	 in	Authoritarian	Regimes”,	 in	 Ginsburg	&	Moustafa,	 ibid,	 59;	 Pierre	 Landry,	 “The	 Institutional	 Diffusion	 of	 Courts	 in	 China:	 Evidence	 from	 Survey	 Data”,	 in	 Ginsburg	 &	Moustafa,	 ibid,	 207.	 See	 also	Moustafa’s	 insightful	 review	 of	 the	 literature	 on	 the	 role	 of	 courts	 in	 authoritarian	 regimes,	 Tamir	Moustafa,	“Law	and	Courts	in	Authoritarian	Regimes”	(2014),	10	Annual	Review	of	Law	and	Social	Science	281;	John	Gillespie	&	HY	Albert	Chen	eds,	Legal	Reforms	in	China	and	Vietnam:	A	Comparison	of	Asian	Communist	Regimes	(New	York:	Routledge,	2010)	4	Indeed,	we	could	describe	current	China	Legal	Studies	according	to	their	perception	regarding	relationship	between	court	and	PRC	authoritarian	 Party/State.	 Thus,	 they	 could	 be	 categorized	 as	 Pessimistic	 scholarship,	 Optimistic	 Scholarship	 and	 Pragmatic	Scholarship.	 Pessimistic	 scholars	 have	brilliantly	 described	 the	 cage	 of	 authoritarianism	 in	China,	 they	however	 generally	 regard	such	 cage	 as	 literal	 and	 static,	 and	 they	 also	 fail	 to	 establish	 the	 centrality	 of	 “courts”	 in	 their	 research.	 Positive	 scholars	 often	underemphasize	the	authoritarian	impacts	on	courts	and	focus	too	much	on	what	authoritarian	context	positively	support	judicial	development,	 though	 they	 have	 provided	 several	 meaningful	 observations.	 Pragmatic	 scholarship	 come	 most	 closely	 to	 the	institutional	characters	of	courts,	but	there	are	few,	if	any,	of	them	built	a	comprehensive	framework	that	could	capture	institutional	dynamics	 in	both	ordinary	 justices	and	other	more	 sensitive	 cases	 in	China.	 See,	 for	 example,	Stanley	B.	Lubman,	Bird	 in	a	Cage,	
Legal	Reform	in	China	after	Mao	(Stanford:	Stanford	University	Press,	1999);	Zhang	Qianfan,	“The	People's	Court	in	Transition:	The	prospects	of	 the	Chinese	 judicial	reform”	(2003)	12:34	Journal	of	Contemporary	China	69;	Randall	Peerenboom,	“The	Battle	Over	Legal	 Reforms	 in	 China:	 Has	 There	 Been	 a	 Turn	 Against	 Law?”(2014)	 2:2	 The	 Chinese	 Journal	 of	 Comparative	 Law	 (2014)	 188;	BenJamin	L.	Liebman,	“China’s	Courts:	Restricted	Reform”	(2007)	 	21	Colum.	J.	Asian	L.	1;	Eric	C.	Ip,	“The	Supreme	People’s	Court	and	The	Political	Economy	of	Judicial	Empowerment	in	Contemporary	China”	(2010)	24	Colum.	J.	Asian	L.	367;	Zhu	Suli,	“The	Party	and	the	Courts”,	in	Randall	Peerenboom	in	Randall	Peerenboom	ed.,	Judicial	Independence	in	China:	Lessons	for	Global	Rule	of	Law	Promotion	 (Cambridge:	 Cambridge	 University	 Press,	 2009)	 52;	 Zhang	 Taisu,	 “The	 Pragmatic	 Court:	 Reinterpreting	 The	 Supreme	People’s	Court	of	China”	(2012)	25	Columbia	Journal	of	Asian	Law	1	
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authoritarian rulers, do authoritarian courts have their own agenda? Does similar institutional 
dynamics of courts manifest in China, even it is seemingly atypical?  In other words, whether 
we should put the institutional characters of PRC courts into the established model as already 
has been tested courts in elsewhere, or put forward new conceptions for capturing unique 
institutional characters of Chinese courts? 
 
In 1954, Hoebel’s The Law of Primitive Man has noted that even in the primitive law, there 
are some things that we are familiar but in different form5. Our thinking pattern might limit 
our perception of unfamiliar legal forms. 6 .Indeed, when we start from the universe of 
experience of dealing with court based on Continental and Anglo-American law into the 
world of authoritarian justices, we might be blind for discovering something different in 
forms but similar in the core.  Indeed, PRC court as judicial institution is something different 
in forms but similar in the core. In particular, one of the crucial question is, empirically 
speaking, what are Chinese judges’ agenda? Do they have their own purposes as institution? 
This is one of the fundamental question regarding empirical studies of Chinese court that 
remains to be explored.  
 
Indeed, in the real world, one living in China will be baffled that what drive a judge or court 
to make decision. For example, the traffic police department determined the liability of traffic 
accident. In theory, while one party in the traffic accident is unsatisfied with traffic accidents 
report issued by the police, she has the right to bring up administrative litigation. From one 
could observe, however, is courts in Shenzhen generally refuse to accept most traffic accident 
                                                5	E.	Adamson	Hoebel,	The	Law	of	Primitive	Man	(Cambridge:	Harvard	University	Press,	1954)	at	19-20	6	Hoebel	refused	to	wear	the	hat	of	common-law	style	court-centric	understanding,	which,	as	summarized	by	Cardozo,	“a	principle	or	rule	of	conduct	so	established	as	 to	 justify	a	prediction	with	reasonable	certainty	 that	 it	will	be	enforced	by	the	courts	1f	 its	authority	 is	 challenged.”	 Hoebel	 believed	 that,	 “when	we	 consider	 legal	matters	 in	many	 primitive	 societies,	 if	 we	must	 rely	 on	courts	and	their	predicted	actions	as	the	test	of	law,	we	are	still	left	at	sea.”	He	instead	defines	law	as	the	following	terms:	“A	social	norm	is	legal	if	its	neglect	or	infraction	is	regularly	met,	in	threat	or	in	fact,	by	the	application	of	physical	force	by	an	individual	or	group	possessing	the	socially	recognized	privilege	of	so	acting.”	See	Ibid	at	22-23,	28	
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cases, even though the Supreme People’s Court (SPC) has specifically encouraged lower 
courts to take these cases. This is really interesting because the Shenzhen courts choose to 
draw back from possible judicialization. Why? In a conference, a senior judge in the 
Shenzhen Intermediate People’s Court provided two reasons. First, currently courts do not 
have enough resources to deal with these cases, simply because there are hundreds or 
thousands of these cases happen on everyday basis. Second, the Intermediate Court seems to 
reach a consensus that “if traffic accidents cases do enter the substantial litigation, it would 
be a huge waste of police resources, since it is impossible to recreate the accident scene”. 
Instead, the courts choose to “trust” the judgment of the traffic police. “I believe they might 
only make one mistake among a hundred cases”, said by a senior judge of Administrative 
Litigation Division of Shenzhen Intermediate Court in a closed-door lecture7. Thus, if we 
closely look at the authoritarian judicial system, institutional purposes of courts (and judges) 
seems to be diverse and even counterintuitive. It goes far beyond some assumptions that 
authoritarian court such as the Chinese courts are just the prawn of state power, or just simply 
perform several functions for the regime. They indeed have their own agenda. 
 
This empirical research takes on institutional perspective to capture and conceptualize 
important institutional purposes of Chinese court through a new framework, which analyzes 
institutional self-interest, policy preferences in Supreme People’s Court (SPC) guiding cases 
in PRC courts as entry point for testing our theoretical hypothesis of institutional purposes. 
Importantly, the institutional perspective is embedded with social-legal and interdisciplinary 
nature. Thus, by extension, we should keep an open mind toward methodological pluralism. 
Importantly, although divergence exist, both interdisciplinary approach and traditional social-
legal approach to examine China court is through conceptualization. Conceptual analysis 
                                                7	The	lecture	is	a	closed-door	lecture	in	a	university	in	November,	2016	in	Shenzhen,	China.		We	are	instructed	by	the	organizer	and	speaker	that	we	could	not	disclose	the	exact	date	and	place	of	the	lecture.	
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requires researchers to avoid capturing by the facts, but rather encapsulate the facts with 
certain concepts8.  In this article, Conceptualization would be employed.  
 
Apart from this section, Part 1 as introduction, the following parts of this article will be 
constructed as following sections: Part 2 will establish theoretical framework and elaborate 
our new analytic framework for examining institutional purposes of PRC Court. Part 3 will 
be case analysis. In this section, we will first introduce case categorization in China’s context, 
and then introduce the Guiding Case System in China issued by the SPC. We then, critically 
examine how different types of guiding cases reflect varied institutional purposes of Chinese 
courts. Part 4 will first compare guiding cases by examining institutional purposes in selected 
hyper-political cases, and to present our main findings regarding institutional purposes of 
PRC courts in guiding cases system. Part 5 concludes.  
 
2. Theoretical Hypothesis: Institutional Perspective and Institutional Purposes 
 
2.1 Taking PRC Courts as institutions seriously: Institutional Nature, Institutional Purposes 
and Institutional Maneuvers 
 
The theoretical framework of this research takes on institutional perspective to capture and 
conceptualize important institutional characters of court, which has shifted our attention from 
how courts deliver functions to the authoritarian regime to the institutional nature of 
judiciary9. Institutionalism “focus on how formal and informal rules and procedures of a 
                                                8	In	Potter’s	research	on	China’s	Legal	System,	for	instance,	instead	of	examining	different	sectors	of	public	law	separately,	Potter	has	chosen	the	Concept	“Political	Stability”	to	summarize	the	changing	Constitution,	development	of	criminal	law	and	administrative	law	in	PRC.	Likewise,	 the	 concept	 “Economic	Prosperity”	 contains	major	development	of	private	 law	 in	China,	 including	contract	 law,	torts,	 corporate	 law	and	etc.	 In	each	section	 that	 conceptualized	by	 these	concepts,	he	 then	has	explicitly	analyzed	how	 the	 legal	development	 in	China	has	been	“captured”	by	these	concepts.	See	Pitman	B.	Potter,	China’s	Legal	System	 (Cambridge:	Polity	Press,	2013)	at	5	9	A	stipulative	definition	of	political	institutions	is:	“collections	of	interrelated	rules	and	routines	that	define	appropriate	actions	in	terms	of	relations	between	roles	and	situations.	The	process	involves	determining	what	the	situation	is,	what	role	is	being	fulfilled,	
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given institution actually did influence, constrain, and sometimes even determine what 
organizations and actors do10”.  
 
On the one hand, we view court as governance institution delivering public goods, where 
judges have the need and capacity to camouflage political actions in legal discourse and 
substance of judicial choices 11 . On the other hand, we must not overlook the unique 
characters of court as judicial institution. Judiciary have their own logic in addition to logic 
as governance institution. A modern court generally operates on both logics, although the 
degree of each logic may be manifested differently according to concrete situations.  
 
To takes on institutional perspective, we first come to the realization that, as courts in 
elsewhere, Chinese court is (at least a huge part of) a quintessential third-party dispute 
resolver (TDR) 12 . Like courts in elsewhere, Chinese courts also face crisis of triadic 
legitimacy and it is further aggravated by the fact that court performing other two roles. 
Indeed, “courts are courts of law 13”, i.e., the appearance of triadic structure14 and speaking 
the law languages are two important weapons for Chinese courts to defend their image of 
neutrality (institutional integrity) and expand their territory.   
 
The second pillar of institutional character of PRC courts is institutional purpose. Indeed, 
Chinese courts, like courts in elsewhere, are living organs have their own institutional 
                                                                                                                                                  and	what	obligation	of	that	role	in	that	situation	is”.	Guy	Peters,	Institutional	Theory	in	Political	Science:	The	New	Institutionalism,	3d	ed	(New	York:	Continuum	Books,	2012)	at	29-30	10	Shapiro	&	Sweet,	“Law,	Courts	and	Social	Science”,	 in	Martin	Shapiro	&	Alec	Stone	Sweet,	On	Law,	Politics	&	Judicialization	 (New	York:	Oxford,	2002)	1	at	10	11	Martin	Shapiro,	“Political	Jurisprudence”	in	ibid	19[Political	Jurisprudence];	See	also	ibid,	at	8-9	12Indeed,	almost	every	contemporary	dispute	resolution	mechanism	is	constructed	as	triadic	structure,	which	consist	of	(at	 least)	two	disputants	and	one	dispute	 resolver.	TDR	comprises	 three	core	elements:	 the	dyad,	 the	 third	party,	 and	normative	 structure.	Alec	Stone	Sweet,	“Judicialization	and	the	Construction	of	Governance”	(1999)	32	Comparative	Political	Studies	147	at	148-149	13	Shapiro,	“The	Success	of	Judicial	Review	and	Democracy”,	in	Martin	Shapiro	&	Alec	Stone	Sweet,	supra	note	10,	149	at	165	14	Martin	Shapiro,	Courts:	A	Comparative	and	Political	Analysis	(Chicago:	The	University	of	Chicago	Press,	1981)	at	Chapter	1	
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purposes. As the main arguments of this article, we will specifically elaborate it in the latter 
part. 
 
The third pillar of institutional logic of PRC courts is institutional maneuver. In authoritarian 
context, the responsiveness of courts15 is extremely high. Indeed, from the perspective of 
Principal-Agent(P-A) Model16, we could reveal the dilemma of multi-principal’s problem for 
PRC courts 17 . Indeed, the multi-principal problem has generated the embarrassment of 
Chinese courts for the courts has to survive in the crack of complex multi-principals’ 
environment18. We propose the term “judicial diplomacy” to capture institutional maneuvers 
that PRC courts dealing with such delicate and complex situation caused by multiple P-A 
dilemma. Judicial Diplomacy indicates the phenomenon that PRC courts, seek to achieve 
institutional goals by strategically “dancing” with other Party/State institutions. It answers the 
“how question”: how Chinese courts pursue its own interest and policy preference, as a TDR 
institution, while performing important functions such as social control in authoritarian 
context19.  
 
2.2 Institutional Purposes: Self-interests and Preferring Values of PRC Courts 
                                                15	Indeed,	court	is	a	highly	responsive	institution	which	often	responds	to	change	around	them,	and	this	is	fundamentally	because	courts	cannot	do	much	without	the	assistance	from	other	parts	of	government	and/or	popular	support.	Success	of	Judicial	Review,	
supra	note	13	at	165;	see	also	David	Law,	“How	to	Rig	the	Federal	Courts”	(2011)	99	Geo	LJ	779	at	791-793	16	In	fact,	the	Principal-Agent	relationship	is	a	common	phenomenon.	And	the	P-A	theory	highlights	the	fact	that	the	agent	has	her	own	interests,	which	may	conflict	with	those	of	the	principal.	Therefore,	a	vital	challenge	for	the	principal	is	to	design	an	incentive	structure	to	ensure	that	the	agent	follows	the	principal’s	objectives—a	goal	become	more	difficult	due	to	the	fact	that	the	principal	typically	lacks	complete	information	about	the	agent’s	efforts	and	the	context	in	which	she	acts.	 	See	Pauline	T.	Kim,	“Lower	Court	Discretion”	(2007)	82	NYUL	REV	383	at	401-402	17	Instead	of	 a	monolithic	whole,	 for	 courts,	PRC	Party/State	 governance	 structure	 could	be	viewed	as	 several	major	 “principals”.	Under	the	authoritarian	rule,	of	course,	these	principals	share	important	common	interests,	but	they	have	their	own	interests	and	preferring	goals	simultaneously.	Indeed,	a	classic	classification	of	these	multi	P-A	relationship	of	Chinese	courts	could	be	described	as	follows:	(1)	Central	Party	and	National	Government	of	PRC;	(2)	Gong	Jian	Fa	System,	 including	Politico-Legal	Committee	(PLC),	Public	Security	Bureau,	Procuratorate,	 and	maybe	 the	 recent	established	supervisory	 (jiancha,监察)	organ;	 (3)	Local	Party/State;	and	(4)	(For	lower	courts)	Higher	Courts.	18	On	 the	 one	 hand,	 the	 interaction	 between	 courts	 and	 these	 principals	 could	 be	 roughly	 understood	 as	 different	 functions	 that	courts	 deliver	 to	 each	major	 principal.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 obviously,	 the	 court	will	 seek	 varied	 endorsement	 and	 support	 from	different	principals.	Moreover,	conflicts	are	anticipated	between	common	authoritarian	goals	and	specific	institutional	purposes	of	each	principals.	19	For	example,	there	are	two	common	phenomena	could	be	used	to	concretize	the	abstract	term	to	examine	how	judicial	diplomacy	works.	The	first	one	is	SPC’s	terminological	game,	where	the	supreme	court	make	political	gestures	to	show	political	loyalty	to	the	central	CCP	in	exchange	for	“blessing”	from	the	Party.	The	second	phenomenon	is	“bureaucratic	sympathy	and	coordination”,	a	long	tactic	 that	 local	 courts	 utilize	 bureaucratic	 sympathy	 to	 obtain	 certain	 level	 of	 legitimate	 and	 substantial	 support	 and	coordination(peihe,	配合)	from	different	principals	in	order	to	achieve	institutional	goals.		
	 7	
Inspiring by the philosophical principle of consequentiality and principle of appropriateness, 
we construct a model for examining institutional purposes of PRC courts by differentiating 
between self/institutional interests and preferring values of courts (and judges). On the one 
hand, we first make the assumption that institutional and individual self-interests of PRC 
courts are imbedded in judicial behaviors. On the other hand, we assume preferring policies 
and values PRC courts find desirable are another major type of institutional goals. We further 
divide these preferring values of PRC courts into three categories: Traditional Values, 
Activist Values and Restraining values.  
  
2.2.1 Appropriateness or Consequentiality?  
The logic of appropriateness and logic of consequentiality is important philosophical 
foundation to examine institutional purposes of PRC courts. The logic of appropriateness 
highlights the moral goods behind a behavior. In existing PRC judicial (and legal) studies, we 
are no strange to normative arguments, or questions asking about “right” or “wrong”, “should” 
or “shouldn’t”. Indeed, there are many normative arguments are insightful, but what if the 
“god” determining right or wrong has died? We thus need to think on a perennial argument 
haunting social science, the nature of human acts. That is, whether behavior of courts base on 
logic of appropriateness or logic of consequentiality?  
 
The logic of consequentiality emphasizes the undesirable consequences that one fails to act 
may incur20. In many empirical cases, we found PRC courts are much more affected by the 
logic of consequence than the logic of appropriateness, as we will demonstrate in self and 
institutional interests of PRC courts. This is somewhat ironic in a regime that officially values 
“appropriateness” very much.  
                                                20	The	foundation	of	logic	of	consequences,	as	Madison	has	pointed	out	in	three	hundred	years	ago,	is	the	evil	of	human	nature,	one	important	philosophy	to	understand	the	design	of	legal	system.	Argumentation	from	Posner,	is	one	influential	perspective	starting	from	the	logic	of	consequences.	
	 8	
 
Nevertheless, in general, both individual actions or institutional choices must contain at least 
a portion of moral choices, considering what “ought to be done”. Indeed, institutional 
analysis also suggest that generally institutions have their own preferring values, not to 
mention that the judicial nature of courts, as judicial institution, involves significant moral 
choice making process. For example, how to be “fair” and “neutral” in resolving disputes? 
Among institutional theories, some (such as normative institutionalism) treat organizations as 
more adaptive and normative structures, an institution as expressing “logic of 
appropriateness”. Simply put, the logic of appropriateness highlights the moral goods behind 
a behavior. They claim that “participation in integrative institutions is undertaken on the basis 
of commitment to the goals of the organization, or at least an acceptance of the legitimate 
claims of the organization (or institution) for individual commitment-again, preference 
formation is endogenous to the institution”21. For example, March and Olsen argues that 
institutions have “logic of appropriateness” that influences behavior more than the “logic of 
consequentiality”22.  Although we might get too far to accept March and Olsen’s judgment, 
we could still safely assume that the logic of appropriateness must to some degree account for 
logic of judicial behavior in PRC. Recognizing this, we answer the question “what are 
Chinese courts looking for” by dividing the institutional purposes of PRC courts into 
self/institutional interests and preferring values/polices.  
 
2.2.2 Self-Interest of Chinese Courts: Institutional and Individual Perspectives 
                                                21	“In	this	context,	the	logic	of	appropriateness	created	by	membership	in	the	institution-	along	with	the	routines,	standard	operating	procedures,	and	symbols	that	help	to	define	the	institution:	provide	the	context	of	behavior	of	the	members.”	See	supra	note	7	at	27-29	22	Supra	note	9	at	30	
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Under our theoretical hypothetic framework, both institutional and self-interests are 
imbedded in judicial behaviors of PRC courts, as major institutional purposes, reflecting 
largely the “principle of consequentiality”. 
 
On the one hand, judges in China have the general tendency to pursue their own personal 
interest “as everybody does”. Following Posner, we model the judicial unity functions to 
view judges as ordinary people responding rationally to ordinary incentives23. Indeed, even 
mere empirical experience when one living in China for years could easily see judges do 
share many of these ordinary incentives. In particular, Chinese judges lacking financial and 
career secure make they tend to reflect “judicial maximization” on material interests and 
career safety. Thus, it is possible to define several common self-interests for Chinese judges. 
Although these self-interests varies according to different circumstances, we are able to 
identify at least several common “interests” for Chinese judges: (1) Salary and other material 
treatment; (2) Workload, which directly relate to caseload and other administrative affairs; (3) 
Career security and advancement; (4) Personal reputation, popularity and prestige, which are 
similar to Posner’s analysis of American judges to “seek prestige” among the lawyers and 
litigants who bring case before the judges24. Further, in Chinese culture, “face” or “mianzi” 
could be one important type of personal reputation. In addition, in the extreme form, 
corruption may also be categorized into another type of “self-interest”. 
 
                                                23	In	 1974,	 Richard	 Posner’s	 “What	 Do	 Judges	 and	 Justices	 Maximize?	 (The	 Same	 Thing	 Everybody	 Else	 Does)”	 has	 presents	 a	positive	 economic	 theory	 of	 the	 behavior	 of	 appellate	 judges	 and	 judges	 in	 the	 US.	 His	 central	 point	 is	 that	 the	 judges	 have	significant	economic	incentives	to	pursue	their	own	self-interest,	and	models	the	judicial	unity	functions	to	view	judges	as	ordinary	people	 responding	 rationally	 to	 ordinary	 incentives.	 In	 this	 research,	 the	 central	 concern	 is	 basically	 designed	 to	 show	 what	individual	 self-interest	 a	 judge	 go	 through	during	mental	 process	 in	order	 to	make	 that	particular	 judicial	 behavior.	To	be	more	specific,	Posner	identifies	some	core	elements	of	the	judicial	utility	functions	including:	(1)	Popularity	and	prestige,	which	refers	to	judges’	incentive	to	“seek	prestige”	among	“the	lawyers	and	litigants	who	bring	case	before	the	judges”.	(2)	Avoiding	reversal	and	obviously	 (3)	 Personal	 reputation.	 Posner	 view	 judge	 as	 spectator	 and	 as	 gamester,	 but	 he	 rule	 out	 the	 consideration	 of	 public	interest	 because	 it	 is	 “inconsistent	with	 an	 approach	 that	 treats	 judges	 as	 ‘ordinary	 beings.’”	 In	 addition,	 factors	 such	 as	 judges’	social	background	or	life	experiences,	and	their	desire	to	clear	their	dockets	are	likely	to	play	a	role	in	the	interstices	of	the	law.	See	Richard	A.	Posner,	“What	Do	Judges	and	Justices	Maximize?	(The	Same	Thing	Everybody	Else	Does)”	(1993)	3	Sup	Ct	Econ	Rev	1	at	1-3	24	Ibid	at	10	
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On the other hand, under rational/utilitarian framework, an institution, court also would have 
the general tendency to enlarge its own scope and influence of power. Courts, indeed, share 
intrinsic tendency of institution to self-empower in order to secure its institutional financial 
interest and enhance social-politico status. And since the foundation of judicial empowerment 
depends on its nature as professional TDR institution, judicial professionalism is in the center 
of institutional interests of PRC courts to increase institutional power. Indeed, even taking 
accounting of disparity between self-interest of individual institutional member and the 
collective interest of institution, a rational judge or official in the court probably would not 
oppose measures that increases judicial professionalism for empowering the court in 
institutional level. In this regard, we would also make connection with pragmatic scholarship 
in China legal studies suggesting courts have institutional tendency for increasing their 
professionalism to make more “impacts”25. Law, or “normative preference26”, as important 
tool to enhance institutional interest and meta-policy preference for courts as judicial 
institutions. In other words, law, legal doctrines and legal norms, have independent normative 
force that cannot be reduced to purely strategic explanations for achieving other public 
policies27. Courts and judges may care more about normative goals, i.e., faithful to law, or 
choosing appropriate legal values than substantial policies in many cases, as independent 
preferences separating them from many other governance institutions. Indeed, in many 
                                                25	As	some	pragmatic	research	did.	For	example,	see	Zhang	Taisu,	“The	Pragmatic	Court:	Reinterpreting	the	Supreme	People’s	Court	of	China”	(2012)	25	Columbia	Journal	of	Asian	Law	1;	see	also,	Eric	C.	Ip,	“The	Supreme	People’s	Court	and	The	Political	Economy	of	Judicial	Empowerment	in	Contemporary	China”	(2010)	24	Colum.	J.	Asian	L.	367	26	The	 conception	 of	 “normative	 preference”	 is	 provided	 by	 Pauline	 T.	 Kim’s	 “Lower	 Court	Discretion”,	which	 typically	model	 the	judicial	 hierarchy	 regarding	 principal-agent	 relationship.	 She	 tries	 to	 argue	 when	 lower	 courts	 implement	 policies	 set	 by	 US	Supreme	 court,	 law	 also	 shapes	 the	 decision-making	 environment	 of	 the	 lower	 federal	 courts.	 Complying	with	 Supreme	 Court’s	precedent	is	important	factors	for	lower	courts	judges	making	independent	judgments.	Importantly,	Kim	argues	that,	discrete	power	is	 the	 room	where	 judges	 could	 pursue	 their	 policy	 preference	 and	 normative	 preference.	 At	 last	 but	 not	 the	 least,	 in	 terms	 of	normative	preference,	the	fact	that	lower	courts	may	not	necessary	comply	with	Supreme	Courts’	precedents	may	move	against	the	centralization	 of	 Supreme	 Court’s	 power.	 	 For	 example,	 Kim	 concludes	 that	 the	 fear	 of	 reversal	 is	 insufficient	 to	 explain	 judicial	behavior,	and	this	make	the	principal-agent	model	presents	a	puzzle.	Principal-agent	models	have	often	overlooked,	however,	is	that	legal	rules	also	restrain	the	use	of	that	reversal	power	by	reviewing	courts.	She	then	turns	out	another	explanation	for	lower	court	compliance	is	that	judges	have	legal	preferences	independent	of	their	political	preferences.	More	precisely,	even	if	judges	care	about	whether	the	outcome	in	a	given	case	advances	their	preferred	policy,	they	likely	care	about	whether	it	conforms	to	legal	norms	as	well.	 In	 the	 US,	 perhaps	 the	 most	 significant	 legal	 restraint	 is	 contained	 in	 28	 U.S.C.	 §	 1291,	 which	 grants	 courts	 of	 appeals	jurisdiction	only	over	appeals	 from	 final	decisions	of	 the	district	 courts.	 Legal	 rules	prescribing	 standards	of	 review	also	 require	reviewing	courts	to	exercise	self-restraint	in	the	use	of	their	reversal	power	in	certain	circumstances.	However,	Kim’s	research	leave	a	serious	question	to	be	answered:	Does	normative	preference	is	also	valid	for	authoritarian	courts?	See	supra	note	16	at	417-18	27	Ibid	at	385	
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occasions, the reason why Chinese courts care more about legal variables than policy 
variables may because they remain weaker institutions comparing with many other 
Party/State institutions in authoritarian context. In short, normative structure thus is an 
important aspect to strengthen authority and power of Chinese Courts.  
 
2.2.3 Policy Preference: Traditional, Activist and Restraining Values 
In addition to self/institutional interest, PRC courts also pursue their policies and values they 
find desirable as the other major type of institutional goals. It is indeed no secret that modern 
courts act rationally to bring public policy as close as possible to their own preferred 
outcome28. Essentially, courts’ policymaking is a process where courts have both authority 
and capacity to distribute or re-allocate resources in a community. Policy preference of courts 
could also be described as a desirable values or choices of values for courts in specified time 
and space.  
 
In this article, we tend to divide these preferring values29 into three categories: (1) Traditional 
values/policies that upheld conventional socialist values or traditional Chinese ethics. (2) 
Activist values or policies that act more progressive against traditional values held by other 
state institutions and Chinese society. And (3) restraining values or policies that actively or 
voluntarily “step back” from social autonomy and realm of other government30.  
 
There are at least two merits for categorizing preferring values into traditional, activist and 
restraining groups. First, Party-State and Chinese society have provided arena that 
                                                
28	Mcnollgast,	“Politics	and	the	Courts:	A	Positive	Theory	of	Judicial	Doctrine	and	the	Rule	of	Law”	(1995)	68	S	Cal	L	Rev	1631	at	1636	29	Of	course,	we	might	also	differentiate	between	“concrete	policy”	that	only	affect	dyadic	relationship	and	“abstract	policy”	that	may	create	precedential	effect	that	affect	undetermined	person	in	the	future.	Viewing	from	relationship	between	policy	made	by	courts	and	legislatives,	“policy”	made	by	courts	could	be	complementary/affiliated	vis-a-vis	existing	legislation,	or	be	“freestanding”	from	existing	normative	framework.	We	could	also	divide	polices	into	different	categories,	such	as	economic	policy	and	social	policy.	30	which	 is	different	than,	say,	 the	US	model	of	“judicial	activism”	and	“judicial	restraint.”	See,	 for	example,	Orrin G. Hatch, “Judicial 
Nomination Filibuster Cause and Cure” (2005), Utah L. Rev. 803 at 805-806, 813 
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institutional purposes of Chinese court could be revealed. To be more specific, traditional 
values refer to values mainly held by the Party/State or the Chinese society. For activist 
values, they mean values transcending inherent values held by authoritarian and bureaucratic 
institution in Party/State as well as traditional Confucian and Legalist (fajia) values inherited 
from ancient Chinese society. For restraining values, they highlight the idea that the court 
engages in self-restraint in order to preserve the social autonomy that is precious in 
authoritarian context in China. Thus, restraining values are also closely related to Chinese 
regime and society as well. 
 
The second significance for distinguishing traditional, activist and restraining values is 
because of its methodological edges. A well-accepted approach to study China’s “Socialist 
Rule of Law” system and its institution is through “functional approach”, which means 
identifying and delineating the function of the legal rules and institutions31. Indeed, a classic 
social-legal analysis research paradigm for empirically studying Chinese court requires close 
examination on CCP, government structure and Chinese society32. Although our theoretical 
framework is constructed on the basis of institutionalism, viewing court as an active and 
living institution with its own agenda, we still have to admit the great merit to examine 
institutional purposes of courts through interactions between courts, Party/State and society. 
                                                31	Accordingly,	attentions	should	not	only	be	paid	to	normative	structure,	but	also	to	economic	actors,	politics,	social	structure,	and	culture.	For	example,	Lubman’s	studies	showed	Maoist	legacy	and	traditional	impact	has	both	leaved	its	mark	on	the	post-Mao	legal	reform	in	China.	See	Stanley	B.	Lubman,	Bird	in	a	Cage,	Legal	Reform	in	China	after	Mao	(Stanford:	Stanford	University	Press,	1999)	at	14-16,	53	and	86	32	Historically	speaking,	China’s	legal	studies	were	long	regarded	as	one	branch	of	sociology	in	the	West	for	at	least	three	reasons.	Firstly,	if	adopting	western	criteria,	China’s	court,	especially	in	the	early	stage	after	1978,	did	not	develop	a	complete	jurisprudence	that	welcome	people	outside	China	conduct	substantial	amount	doctrinal	analysis,	though	numerous	researches	in	Chinese	language	have	 already	 done	 so	 since	 the	 1990s.	 Secondly,	 from	 Liberal-Democratic	 Standard,	 because	 Chinese	 courts	 still	 fail	 to	 portray	themselves	 as	 separate	 and	 independent	 branch	 from	 bureaucracy,	 or	 a	 constitutional	 institution	 to	 check	 the	 executive	 and	legislative	branches.	Obviously,	if	court	is	internal	part	of	bureaucracy,	the	effective	way	to	look	at	it	is	through	social-political	lens.	Thus	such	observation	(or	bias)	inevitably	affects	methodology	until	today.	The	third	reason,	however,	is	more	fortuitous.	Pioneers	of	China	study	 in	 the	West	before	 the	1980s	are	usually	sociologist	and	other	social	 scholars	who	dedicated	 themselves	 to	study	meaningful	differences	between	Chinese	society	and	western	society.	Later	on,	when	 the	 first	generation	of	China’s	 legal	experts	started	a	more	“legal”	research,	the	majority	material	they	could	only	rely	on	were	pervious	researches	on	China’s	society	done	by	sociologists	 and	 other	 social	 science	 scholars.	 And	 this	 is	 where	 strong	 social-legal	 methodological	 dominance	 in	 international	China’s	 legal	 study	 coming	 from.	 In	 other	 word,	 contemporary	 China	 legal	 study	 in	 the	 West	 was	 born	 with	 the	 birthmark	 of	sociology.	Undoubtedly,	my	research	also	could	not	escape	the	sheer	amount	of	influence	from	social-legal	studies.	
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The categorization of traditional, activist and restraining values thus are good candidate for 
this. 
 
3. Testing Empirical Data: Cases in Chinese Courts and Judicial Guiding Cases  
 
3.1 Ordinary Cases, Sensitive Cases and Hyper-Political Cases in China 
Our case categorization for examining institutional characters of PRC courts is based on the 
relationship between the authoritarian factors and courts’ institutional logic. The nature and 
extents of institutional characters and authoritarian impacts are reflected by courts in different 
types of cases. We roughly divide cases in PRC context into three categories: ordinary cases, 
sensitive cases and hyper-political cases.  
 
Ordinary cases are the farthest from central interests of authoritarian rule. Ordinary cases 
comprise civil, criminal and administrative cases in China. They are generally not perceived 
as “politically dangerous” by the Party/State, nor they are sensitive in political, economic and 
social sense. Equally important, these cases are “ordinary” because they are large in number 
comparing with other two categories. In ordinary cases, court makes rules and exerts social 
control while engaging in TDR. Importantly, PRC courts generally feel more comfortable to 
announce their preferring public goods, and free to pursue their own goals in ordinary cases. 
Chinese courts act like their counterpart in elsewhere, to actively pursue institutional goals in 
social-economic affair on their own in many of these cases.  
 
The second category is sensitive cases, which are half way between the ordinary case and the 
more sensitive hyper political cases. They may be “too hot” so that the authoritarian power 
may interfere, but they might be “relatively safe” because it is unnecessary or too costly for 
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the authoritarian ruler to take very seriously. However, they may involve with institutional 
interests or goals of other governance institutions which generate external pressure. Indeed, 
we could further divide “Sensitive cases” into several sub-categories: non-hyper political 
cases involving civil rights or PRC constitutional laws, economic-social sensitive cases 
entailing huge social and economic impacts, such as land-disputes cases, and cases have both 
political and social/economic sensitivity. Generally, in these sensitive cases, PRC courts may 
care more about their self/institutional interest and have less room for expressing their 
preferring values because of the external pressures. Yet, in some cases judges may push 
forward to positively make public policy for the society33.  
 
The third category will be hyper-political cases. Comparing with ordinary cases and sensitive 
cases, hyper-political cases are extremely small in number34. In hyper-political cases, the 
authoritarian regime relentlessly turns them into political trials to punish the dissenter(s), 
whom the regime regards as direct challenger against “red-line” of the authoritarian rule. The 
outcomes of these cases usually have been per-determined and their judicial process only 
constitute one of the chain of crackdown. While some of these cases is open to public, others 
are still under secret trials. In these hyper-political cases, many have assumed that the courts 
have no room to do anything. However, empirical evidence shows that in hyper-political 
cases, Chinese courts may mainly choose to seek to protect their institutional integrity 
(institutional interest) and pursue possible normative values because courts’ preferring policy 
may be surpassed by the role as social controller for the authoritarian regime.  
 
                                                33	For	 PRC	 courts,	 sensitive	 cases	 are	 “in	 the	 middle	 ground”	 since	 courts	 tend	 to	 be	 very	 cautious	 for	 declaring	 their	 policy	preferences.	In	these	cases,	courts’	decision	and	reasoning	may	also	become	too	sensitive	that	judges’	self-interest	and	institutional	interest	of	the	courts	maybe	negatively	impacted.	34	Pragmatically,	 this	 is	caused	by	at	 least	two	reasons.	The	first	reason	is	because	few	people	directly	challenge	the	authoritarian	regime	and	seek	 for	political	change.	The	second	reason	 is	 the	state	machinery	could	only	bring	a	small	number	of	opponents	 to	courts.	
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In this article, we mainly choose ordinary cases as our principal empirical data for testing our 
hypothesis on institutional purposes on PRC courts. Nevertheless, we will also use hyper-
political cases as contrast group to examine institutional purposes of Chinese courts. 
 
3.2 The Overview of Guiding Cases 
 
For examining institutional purposes of PRC courts, we mainly choose judicialization in SPC 
guiding cases system as entry point for understanding institutional purposes in ordinary 
justices. Starting from 2011, usually every 3 months, the SPC have consistently issued 16 
“batches” of guiding cases. These cases are submitted by the lower courts, and then discussed, 
selected and organized by the SPC Adjudicate Committee before published. On December 20, 
2011, the SPC issued the first batch of guiding cases. The most recent batch was published in 
March 2017. These guiding cases cover criminal, civil and administrative litigations. While 
some address procedural problems, other dealing with substantial issues; some of them are 
directly tried or by the SPC, whereas most of them are adjudicated in lower courts. Most of 
these guiding cases were judgment of first trial and second trial, but there are small number 
of re-trial (zaishen) cases. Among these 87 guiding cases so far (until June 2017), we could 
not only examine court’s manner of interaction with other parts of Party/State, but also 
reveals how a court tackle disputes in a transitional society.  
 
Guiding cases manifest important institutional characters of courts, and it is good entry point 
for examining institutional purposes of PRC courts. First, the SPC guiding cases could 
largely mitigate the problem of discrepancy of institutional goals between lower courts and 
SPC. All of these cases, except for those adjudicated by SPC itself, were submitted on their 
own by the lower courts. They then selected by the SPC after discussion on the Adjudicate 
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Committee of SPC35. Second, guiding cases are arguably high quality because they have been 
“pre-selected” twice before publishing. A “low quality” case obviously would not become a 
guiding case36. Third, guiding cases cover almost all important matters in ordinary justices. 
Although this usually means that sensitive cases and political sensitive cases has already been 
ruled out, the guiding cases system consist of both substantial and procedural problems in 
civil, criminal and administrative litigations in PRC courts, and many of them have great 
practical significance. In particular, many guiding cases reflect courts’ incentive and capacity 
of going further in ordinary justices even facing the administrative bodies or procuratorate.   
 
In the next part, we will apply our analytic framework to examine institutional purposes in 
guiding cases from 2011 to 2017. We could explore major institutional purposes, 
self/institutional interest as well as preferring values that PRC courts pursue in guiding cases. 
To be more specific, we select guiding cases with typical or strong institutional purposes 
from guiding cases system, then put them into five groups for further analysis: self-interests, 
institutional interests, traditional values, activist values and restraining values.  
 
3.3 Case Analysis: Institutional Purposes in SPC Guiding Cases System 
 
3.3.1 The Guiding Case No.51: Manifestation of Self-interest of Judges 
Our model provides that judges, just as everybody else, may care about their individual 
interests such as workload, material treatment, reputation and etc. However, such individual 
self-interest may be difficult to discover if we merely look at the text of judgment. For 
guiding cases, because they are selected to be “future reference for similar cases”, it may be 
reasonable to assume that such “self-interest of judges” would be more difficult to be spotted. 
                                                35	SPC,	SPC	Stipulation	on	Works	of	Guiding	Cases	[Zuigao	renmin	fayuan	guanyu	an’li	zhidao	gongzuo	de	guiding]	(Nov	26	2010)	36	Ibid	
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However, the Case No.51, Abdul Waheed v. China Eastern Air Holding Company (CEA, a 
Mainland China airline Company), a dispute over a contract for the carriage of passengers by 
air, is indeed an excellent example displaying self-interest among guiding cases.  
 
In this Case, the plaintiff Abdul Waheed, a foreign citizen, purchased an interline ticket 
issuing by Hong Kong Cathay Pacific Airways Limited (CPA, a Hong Kong airline 
company). The flight departed from Shanghai, then transferred in Hong Kong to the 
destination, Karachi. The actual carrier for the flight from Shanghai to the Hong Kong was 
CEA. The CEA flight from Shanghai was prohibited from taking off by the weather, causing 
the plaintiff unable to catch the CPA flight from Hong Kong to Karachi. The CEA refused to 
arrange alternative flight nor any reimbursement for the plaintiff. The plaintiff then sued the 
CEA in People’s Court of Shanghai Pudong New District (Pudong Court). The Pudong Court 
cited international treaties37, and a domestic law, Article 142 of the General Principles of the 
Civil Law of the PRC to establish its jurisdiction.  
 
However, after establishing the jurisdiction, the court find itself face a problem that CPA is 
an international airline with the headquarter in Hong Kong. Because of an all-known reason 
that it would be difficult to summon an HK corporation to Mainland Chinese courts. But 
failure to do so may not only increase the difficulty for the judges to work on the case, but it 
would also mitigate courts’ authority. In particular, it would embarrass the court if defendant 
is absent from the standing. Second, enforcement would be a problem under such 
circumstance. Even today, according to current law of PRC and bilateral agreement signed by 
Mainland China and Hong Kong, seeking to cooperating enforcement from Hong Kong in 
civil disputes demand a prolonged and complex procedure. It would be extreme costly for 
                                                37	These	 international	 treaties	 include	 the	Convention	 for	 the	Unification	of	Certain	Rules	Relating	 to	 International	Carriage	by	Air	
signed	 at	Warsaw	 in	 1929,	 amended	 at	 The	Hague	 in	 1955,	 and	 the	Convention,	 Supplementary	 to	 the	Warsaw	 Convention,	 for	 the	
Unification	of	Certain	Rules	Relating	to	International	Carriage	by	Air	Performed	by	a	Person	Other	Than	the	Contracting	Carrier.	
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going through such complex process only for dealing with such a simple case. However, the 
problem was both parties entering contract of carriage is the plaintiff and CPA but not CEA. 
Fortunately, the window of opportunity showed up when the plaintiff chose to initiate 
litigation listing only CEA as defendant. Perhaps conspired by the attorney of the plaintiff, 
the court pre-rejects the possibility that the CEA may attempt to get CPA involved in the 
litigation because the CEA has the full legal right and channel to do so. The court thus states 
that, “although China Eastern Airlines had the right to demand that CPA participate in the 
litigation, it was not necessary to add CPA as a party to participate in the litigation, given the 
circumstances of the case and considering the litigation costs.38”  
 
The ground that the court base on this decision thus is the necessity but not legality. The 
“cost” of litigation is a central consideration among other institutional purposes in this case. 
In fact, saving the litigation costs have not much different than reducing the workload of 
judges, the time and efforts that a judge may dedicate to a case. Moreover, for the judges 
hearing this case, it could prevent “losing face” especially in front of a plaintiff coming from 
foreign land. Indeed, apart from guiding cases system, in many other everyday ordinary cases 
trying by PRC courts, there have been more occasion that judges decide the cases in some 
ways primarily for the sake of self-interests. Moreover, in some other occasions, judicial 
corruption could be viewed as one extreme type of “self-interest”, which plays central roles 
in numerous ordinary cases in China.    
 
3.3.2 Institutional Self-Empowerment in Guiding Cases and Legalism  
 
                                                38	Abdul	Waheed	 v.	 China	 Eastern	Airlines	 Corporation	 Limited,	 A	Dispute	 over	 a	 Contract	 for	 the	 Carriage	 of	 Passengers	 by	Air,	Guiding	Case	No.51,	China	Guiding	Cases	Project,	Stanford	Law	School,	online:<https://cgc.law.stanford.edu/guiding-cases/guiding-case-51/>	
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Apart from self-interests, institutional empowerment is the other face of PRC courts’ 
institutional interests. And Legalism is the crucial tool for courts to self-empower and enlarge 
their power and authority. Indeed, this has been confirmed from numbers of empirical 
research39. In the following guiding cases, we could see that the PRC courts, on its own, 
strengthening institutional power to enhance its social-political status. On a more frequent 
basis, this could be reflected by the fact that the court uses normative weapon to expand the 
scope of jurisdiction and institutional mechanism. 
 
On the one hand, we could observe from in a number of guiding cases Chinese courts have 
the institutional incentive to expand the scope of judicial power. More frequently, this may be 
achieved by taking advantage of legislative blank left by the national legislature, the National 
People’s Congress(NPC) and its Standing Committee. But it also be achieved at the expanse 
of administrative bodies, or directly intrude the garden of society. For example, in guiding 
Case No. 38, while the legal status is ambiguous, the court increased its territory by including 
higher education institutions into the scope of proper defending administrative bodies40. In 
Guiding Case 59, another administrative case, likewise, the court incorporated fire 
department into the coverage of its own jurisdiction by the same logic41.  
 
                                                39	See,	example,	Sunsan	Trevaskes,	“Mapping	the	Political	Terrain	of	Justice	Reform	in	China”	(2014)	2:1	Griffith	Asia	Quarterly	18;	Randall	Peerenboom,	China’s	Long	March	toward	Rule	of	Law	(New	York:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2002);	see	also	supra	note	25	40	The	court’s	opinion	in	this	case	is	firmly	built	on	normative	logic:	“the	relationship	between	a	higher	education	institution	and	a	person	who	receives	an	education	 [at	 the	 institution]	 is	 [one	of]	educational	administration	management.	 [Where]	a	person	who	receives	 an	 education	 is	 dissatisfied	with	 a	management	 act	 of	 a	 higher	 education	 institution	 that	 involves	his	 basic	 rights,	 [that	person]	 has	 the	 right	 to	 initiate	 administrative	 litigation,	 [and	 the]	 higher	 education	 institution	 is	 a	 qualified	 defendant	 in	 the	administrative	litigation.”	Tian	Yong	v.	The	University	of	Science	and	Technology	Beijing,	A	Case	of	a	Refusal	to	Award	a	Graduation	Certificate	 and	 a	 Degree	 Certificate,	 Guiding	 Case	 No.38,	 China	 Guiding	 Cases	 Project,	 Stanford	 Law	 School,	online:<https://cgc.law.stanford.edu/guiding-cases/guiding-case-38/>	41	This	 is	 achieved	 by	 carefully	 constructing	 legal	 logic:	 “Fire	 department	 register	 and	 randomly	 inspect	 fire	 prevention	 of	construction	projects…reflect	the	nature	of	exercising	administrative	power,	demonstrating	the	will	of	nation,	the	characteristic	of	law,	the	nature	of	public	welfare,	a	monopoly	and	coercive	[power].	[Thus],	the	notification	of	the	result	of	registration	constitute	the	action	of	registration…share	characteristics	of	administrative	power,	and	thus	 it	should	be	under	the	scope	of	 judicial	review	(sifa	 shencha).	See	Dai	Shihua	su	Jinanshi	Gonganxiaofangzhidui	Xiaofang	Yanshou	Jiufen’an	[Dai Shihua v. Fire Control Detachment 
of Public Security Organ of Jinan City], Chinacourt.org, 
online:<http://www.chinacourt.org/article/detail/2016/06/id/1893356.shtml> 
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On the other hand, another frequent practice for expanding reviewing scope is at the expanse 
of administrative institutions in guiding cases. In other words, the court expands its 
jurisdictional power by including more issues into the coverage of judicial review. And such 
expansion is achieved by “harming” the authority of administrative bodies. For example, 
Guiding Case No.7 was an ordinary civil dispute. But after the plaintiff got the Supreme 
People’s Procuratorate (SPP) involved, the adjudicating process had been turned into an 
arena, where the competition with SPP became fierce and direct42. Guiding Case NO.7 shows 
how an authoritarian court appeal to the normative tool to strengthen institutional authority 
where the court seeks to expand judicial authority at the expanse of procuratorate power43. 
Guiding Case No.22 is another excellent example for expanding judicial power at the 
expanse of administrative authority. In Guiding Case No.22, the Court broke the orthodox 
doctrine that internal replies made by higher government is nonjudiciable44, opining: “where 
the administrative department directly implements the reply, generating an actual impact on 
the rights and obligations of the administrative counterpart, and where the administrative 
counterpart is dissatisfied with the reply and initiates litigation, the people’s court should 
                                                42	In	this	case,	there	was	actually	confrontation	between	court	and	procuratorate.	Under	the	PRC	legal	system,	procuratorate	has	the	power	to	protest	or	literarily	“counter-appeal”	(抗诉)	a	judgment	of	they	consider	the	judgment	is	problematic.	The	No.7	is	a	re-trial	case	 heard	 by	 the	 SPC.	 However,	 the	 parties	 had	 reached	 a	 settlement	 and	 finished	 performing	 such	 settlement,	 and	 they	 then	submitted	a	Petition	for	withdrawing	the	retrial.	After	examination,	the	SPC	approved	the	petition	by	a	Civil	Ruling.	However,	while	the	 retrial	 application	 was	 applied	 to	 court,	 the	 plaintiff	 also	 applied	 to	 the	 procuratorate	 for	 a	 protest.	 The	 Supreme	 People’s	Procuratorate	 (SPP)	 accepted	 the	 application	 and	 lodge	 a	 protest	 against	 this	 case.	 However,	 the	 SPC,	 on	 the	 ground	 that	 “the	dispute	had	already	been	resolved,	and	the	reason	for	applying	for	a	protest	by	the	procuratorate	and	that	for	applying	for	a	retrial	were	 basically	 identical”.	 The	 Adjudication	 Supervision	 Tribunal	 of	 SPC	 then	 communicated	with	 the	 SPP	 and	 suggested	 that	 it	withdraw	 its	 protest.	 However,	 the	 SPP	 refused	 to	withdraw	 its	 protest.	 The	Adjudication	 Supervision	 Tribunal	 again	 contacted	plaintiff,	and	the	plaintiff	again	submitted	a	Petition	for	Withdrawal	of	the	Case	to	the	Supreme	People’s	Court.	On	July	6,	2011,	the	SPC	again	issued	a	Civil	Ruling	to	terminate	the	examination	of	this	case.	Indeed,	one	of	the	two	major	justification	that	the	SPC’s	rejection	 of	 protest	 on	 a	 case	 from	 SPP	 is	 “national	 interests	 or	 social	 and	 public	 interests”,	 that	 “the	 parties	 have	 reached	 a	settlement	and	finished	performing	it,	or	withdrawn	the	petition	and	such	withdrawal	would	not	adversely	affect	national	interests	or	social	and	public	interests.	Thus,	the	actual	institutional	purpose	that	the	SPC	pursue	in	this	case	is	more	normative.	And	indeed,	what	SPC	argue	here	is	a	right-based	question.		“In	order	to	respect	and	protect	the	parties’	rights	to	freely	dispose	of	their	lawful	rights	 and	 interests	within	 the	 scope	 of	 law	 and	 to	 realize	 the	 unification	 of	 the	 legal	 effects	 and	 social	 effects	 of	 litigation”	 the	people’s	 court	 should	 rule	 to	 terminate	 the	 retrial	 proceeding	 in	 accordance	with	 Article	 34	 of	 the	Interpretation	 of	 the	 SPC	 on	Several	 Issues	Concerning	the	Application	of	the	Adjudication	Supervision	Procedures	of	the	“Civil	Procedure	Law	of	the	People’s	Republic	of	China”.	Based	on	these	argumentation,	the	SPC	declare	that	“the	basis	upon	which	the	procuratorial	organ	protested	no	longer	existed.”	And	thus	“there	was	no	need	for	a	ruling	to	retry	the	case	pursuant	to	a	protest	proceeding.”	SPC	in	this	case,	has	rarely	won	a	battle	when	deal	with	the	procuratorate.	Indeed,	the	case	could	become	guiding	case	for	an	important	reason	that	the	SPC	 has	 rarely	 achieved	 such	 a	 success.	 See	 Mudanjiang Municipality Hongge Construction and Installation Co., Ltd. V. Mudanjiang 
Municipality Hualong Real Estate Development Co.,Ltd. And Zhang Jizeng, A Construction Project Contract Dispute, Guiding Case No.7, 
China Guiding Cases Project, Stanford Law School, online:<https://cgc.law.stanford.edu/guiding-cases/guiding-case-7/>	43	We	have	to	consider	that	as	the	near	four	decades	practice	since	the	1978	has	shown,	the	procuratorate’s	power	is	like	sword	of	Damocles,	 hanging	 over	 the	 SPC	 and	 all	 lower	 courts	 in	 China.	 Fu	 Hualing,	 “Autonomy,	 Courts	 and	 the	 Politico-Legal	 Order	 in	Contemporary	 China”,	 in	 Cao	 Liqun,	 Ivan	 Sun	&	Bill	Hebenton	 eds,	 The	Routledge	Handbook	 of	 Chinese	 Criminology	 (New	York:	Routledge,	2013)	76	44	Traditionally,	 replies	 made	 by	 government	 body	 to	 their	 affiliated	 department	 is	 generally	 internal	 administrative	 act,	 which	traditionally	fall	into	the	realm	of	government,	meaning	that	it	is	nonjudiciable.	
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accept [the case] in accordance with law”45. In Guiding Case No. 6946 and Guiding Case 
No.77 then repeated such practice47.  
 
Perhaps one of the boldest moment that Chinese court striving to expand its authority and 
scope of reviewing power is Guiding Case No.5, where the courts even self-established its 
quasi-constitutional review power, although such potential power may not be launched 
immediately. The plaintiff in Guiding Case No5 was a Salt Industry Import and Export 
Company. The defendant, the Salt Administration Bureau of Suzhou Municipality, Jiangsu 
Province (“Suzhou Salt Bureau”), imposed administrative penalties on the plaintiff for 
“purchase and transportation of industrial salt”. The administrative penalties based on a 
provincial governmental department rule, the Implementing Measure of Jiangsu Province on 
the “Salt Industry Administration Regulation” (the “Measure”). 
 
However, in dealing with such ordinary case, the Basic People’s Court of Jinchang District of 
Suzhou City (Jinchang Court), a lowest level court, had deployed a “nuclear option”48, the 
Legislative Law of PRC. The Legislative Law of PRC is a constitutional-nature law 
stipulating the scopes, tiers of statutes and procedure for making laws in PRC legal system, 
which in principle shall not be used by People’s Court in adjudication. It was against this 
                                                45Wei	Yonggao	and	Chen	Shouzhi	v.	The	People’s	Government	of	Lai’an	County,	A	Case	About	a	Reply	 to	Recover	Land-Use	Rights,	Guiding	Case	No.22,	China	Guiding	Cases	Project,	Stanford	Law	School,	online:<https://cgc.law.stanford.edu/guiding-cases/guiding-case-22/>	46	Likewise,	in	Guiding	Case	No.69,	the	Court	hold	that	if	a	party	deem	that	procedural	administrative	act	violate	property	and	other	legal	interest	of	her,	and	while	the	redress	from	substantial	administrative	channel	is	not	available,	the	party	may	bring	the	case	into	court,	 and	 the	 Court	 should	 hear	 the	 case.	 WangMingde	 su	 leshanshi	 Renliziyuan	 he	 shehuibaozhangju	 gongshangrending’an	[Guiding Case No. 69: Wang Mingde v. Human Resources and Social Security Bureau of Leshan City for Dispute 
over Determination of Work-related Injury], Guiding Case No.69, Chinacourt.org, online:<http://www.court.gov.cn/zixun-
xiangqing-27851.html> 47	In	the	Guiding	Case	No.77,	the	court	state	that	if	the	administrative	body	only	issue	a	notification	(gaozhi)	as	reply	of	report	when	an	 informant	 is	 an	 interested	 party,	 it	 should	 be	 excluded	 from	 Article	 1,	 Section	 6	 of	 SPC	 Interpretation	 on	 Several	 Questions	
regarding	Administrative	Procedure	Law	(2010).	Thus,	according	to	court’s	opinion,	the	issue	shall	be	justiciable,	and	shall	be	under	the	reviewing	scope	of	People’s	Court.	According	to	the	Decision,	this	 is	because	using	notification	as	substitution	of	 investigating	result	fail	to	oblige	the	legal	duty	to	protect	informant’s	right,	constituting	a	form	of	violation	of	plaintiff ’s	right	of	seeking	redress	from	 due	 procedure.	 Luorongrong	 su	 ji’anshiwujiaju	 wujia	 xingzheng	 chuli’an	 [Luo Rongrong v. Price Bureau of Ji’an City 
City for Dispute over Price-related Administrative Handling], Guiding Case No.77, Chinacourt.org, online:<	
http://www.court.gov.cn/fabu-xiangqing-34342.html>	48	Originally,	the	Nuclear	Option	in	the	US	refers	to	filibuster	and	change	of	Senate	rule.	See	Dimple Gupta, “The Constitutional optional 
option to change senate rules and procedures: a majoritarian means to overcome the filibuster”(2004), Harvard journal of law and public 
policy, 28:1, 205	
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background that the Jinchang Court use Legislative Law to strengthen judicial authority in 
such an ordinary administrative case. According to the Court, “since the Article 79 of 
the Legislation Law provides that the effect of laws is greater than that of administrative 
regulations, local regulations, and rules; and the effect of administrative regulations is greater 
than that of local regulations and rules.” Because the Article 13 of the Administrative 
Penalties Law prohibit local government rules creating new types and range of administrative 
penalties exceed the scope of Administrative Penalties Law, the court opined that, “the local 
administrative authority cannot establish new administrative licensing or new administrative 
penalty when law and regulation do not establish such administrative licensing or penalty.” 
The local court then took the step further, by stating that:  
 
“The relevant provisions of the Measure were inconsistent with the spirit of the 
aforementioned provisions…[And these violations] were a type of establishment of 
administrative licensing and penalties in violation of upper-level legislation…Although the 
Suzhou Salt Bureau applied the  Measure, it did not abide by the provisions regarding the 
hierarchy of legal effect stated in Article 79 of the Legislation Law, [and] did not follow the 
relevant provisions in the Administrative Licensing Law and the Administrative Penalties 
Law. The application of law was erroneous and [the Bureau’s decision] should be revoked in 
accordance with law.49” 
 
This is a significant guiding case since the Jincheng Court de facto engage in quasi-
constitutional review. Most importantly, in reviewing the dispute provision, the court has 
considered “the hierarchy of legal effect” of local government rule, administrative regulation 
and law, a de facto review of validity of statutes: 
                                                49	Luwei	(Fujian)	Salt	Industry	Import	and	Export	Co.,	Ltd.	Suzhou	Branch	v.	The	Salt	Administration	Bureau	of	Suzhou	Municipality,	Jiangsu	Province,	A	Salt	Industry	Administrative	Penalty	Case,	Guiding	Case	No.5,	China	Guiding	Cases	Project,	Stanford	Law	School,	online:<https://cgc.law.stanford.edu/guiding-cases/guiding-case-5/>	
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“The Measure…did not abide by the provisions regarding the hierarchy of legal effect stated 
in Article 79 of the Legislation Law, [and] did not follow the relevant provisions in 
the Administrative Licensing Law and the Administrative Penalties Law. The application of 
law was erroneous and [the Bureau’s decision] should be revoked in accordance with law.”  
 
Thus, although the court did not formally cross the constitutional barrier to declare the 
provision of Measure invalid, the court has in fact declared the government decision 
“unconstitutional” in the Guiding Case No.5 based on the argumentation that the normative 
document issued by the government, the Measure, is invalid. In other words, this is a 
common tactics for courts to review validity of government statutes in many mature 
constitutional-democratic regimes that establishing a judicial reviewing power without 
directly striking down the normative documents. This may remind us of Marbury in early 
19th US, and the “Seed Case” in Henan province in early 2000s China. The judge in the Seed 
Case was as activist as the judge in Guiding Case No.5, who boldly declared a local 
government rule “contradict with the Seed Law of PRC, a national law promulgated by the 
NPC”50. The difference is judge in Seed Case was forced to resigned after the government 
attacked the court, and the latter become a Guiding Case entrenched by the SPC. Indeed, to 
our knowledge, after it becomes one guiding cases, started from 2013, there are already 10 
cases officially have referenced Guiding Case No.5 in their judgments. 
 
                                                50	On	May	27,	2003,	Judge	Li	Huijuan	of	the	Luoyang	Intermediate	People’s	Court	invalidated	the	Henan	Province	Agricultural	Seeds	Management	Act	on	grounds	of	inconsistency	with	the	national	Seeds	Law	(2001)	in	an	ordinary	civil	case.	The	judgment	was	based	on	Article	64	(unity	and	hierarchy	of	 legal	 rules)	of	 the	Legislation	Law,	a	constitutional	 law	promulgated	by	NPC	 in	2000.	Local	authorities,	including	local	and	provincial	people’s	congresses,	condemned	Judge	Li	exceeding	her	authority.	Judge	Li	took	her	case	to	the	SPC	and	triggered	public	discussion.	Eventually,	largely	because	of	the	public	attention,	Judge	Li	resumed	her	position	in	the	Intermediate	court	in	February	2004.	See	Stephanie	Balme,	Stephanie	Balme,	“The	Judicialisation	of	Politics	and	the	Politicisation	of	the	Judiciary	in	China	(1978-2005)”	(2005)	5:1	Global	Jurist	Frontiers	1	at	34-35	
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On the other hand, apart from expanding scope of reviewing power, normative weapons may 
also be used to enhance the institutional mechanism of courts. For example, normative values 
could assist in enhancing the enforcement of judicial decision in Chinese context, a chronic 
problem 51 . Guiding Case 71 is a case directly related to the problem of “enforcement 
difficulty” (zhixingnan). In this case, in order to strengthen enforcement power, an important 
institutional interest of the court, the intermediate People’s Court of Pingyang County of 
Zhejiang Province pulled out several arrows of legislative intent in its quiver. First, it 
employs the weapon of legislative intent by citing NPCSC’s Interpretation of Article 313 of 
Criminal Law of PRC to declare that the power of enforcement is generated on the date when 
the judgement come into force rather than when the case entering into the process of judicial 
enforcement.  Second, to increase persuasiveness of the legal reasoning, the local court 
further employs the weapon of legislative intent by, on its own, inferring the legislative intent 
of Article 313 of the Criminal Code of PRC: making the social public genuinely respect 
judicial adjudication to maintain the authority of law to solve the enforcement problem.   
 
In addition, sometimes the courts would even directly intrude social realm in order to expand 
its own jurisdiction and authority. For example, in Guiding Case 35, the SPC empower the 
judicial system by stating that court has the authority to conduct a review of the legality of 
both the compulsory auction procedures and the auction results52. 
 
3.3.3 Traditional Values 
                                                51	See	Donald	C.	Clarke,	“Power	and	Politics	in	the	Chinese	Court	System:	the	Enforcement	of	Civil	Judgments”	(1996)	10:1	Colum.	J.	Asian	L.	1	at	27-28;	see	also	Fu	Hualing	&	Richard	Cullen,	“From	Mediatory	to	Adjudicatory	Justice:	The	Limits	of	Civil	Justice	Reform	in	 China”	 in	Margaret	Woo	&	Mary	 Gallagher	 eds.,	 Chinese	 Justice,	 Civil	 Dispute	 Resolution	 in	 Contemporary	 China	 (Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	press,	2011)	25	52According	to	the	SPC,	this	is	because	“compulsory	judicial	auction…is	different	from	an	auction	entrusted	by	a	citizen,	legal	person,	or	other	organization	on	his	or	 its	own	accord	 to	be	 carried	out	by	an	auction	agency.”	Therefore,	 “upon	discovery	of	 illegal	 acts	[occurring]	in	an	auction	that	it	entrusted	[to	another],	a	people’s	court	may,	even	after	the	auction	concludes,	still	rule	the	auction	invalid…[in	situations]	where	there	is	malicious	collusion	in	the	auction	process,	making	fair	bidding	impossible	in	the	auction	and	adversely	affecting	the	legal	rights	and	interests	of	others”	Guangdong	Longzheng	Investment	Development	Co.,	Ltd.	And	Guangdong	Jingmao	Auction	Co.,	Ltd.,	An	Enforcement	Reconsideration	Case	on	an	Entrusted	Auction,	Guiding	Case	No.35,	China	Guiding	Cases	Project,	Stanford	Law	School,	online:<https://cgc.law.stanford.edu/guiding-cases/guiding-case-35/?lang=en>	
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As our theoretical model has proposed, traditional value is one of three types of preferring 
values pursued by PRC court. These traditional values and policies are those shared and even 
enshrined by Party/State and Chinese society, as reflected by a branch of guiding cases. In 
short, in these cases, courts may feel confidence to declare preferring public policy in cases 
because they are shared by Party/State and society. Chinese courts in these cases generally do 
not fill in any legislative blank or achieve institutional purposes at the expanse of 
administrative authority. On the contrary, they may actually help the implementation of 
traditional values and policies, and enhance the authority of government bodies. 
 
It is very clear that, all guiding cases fundamentally resolve disputes in a triadic structure. 
And nearly all cases involve process of choice for public policies. However, it should be 
noted that a large part of these cases only involves rule-making that the court does not try to 
judicialize new areas, nor courts declare activist ideas that are at the expense of other 
government organs. In other words, in many cases while there are several values that have 
already been embraced Party/State or Chinese society, Courts may side with these previous 
values, even though some of these cases may involve legal interpretation. For example, in 
Case No.4 “Wang Zhicai Intentional Murder”, the defendant murdered his girlfriend because 
the victim has rejected his proposal of marriage. The court found he should not be sentence to 
death because the murder is caused by irritation of unsuccessful proposal. A similar case is 
No.12, where the mother of the defendant called the police to arrest the defendant when he 
fleed to a relative’s residence after the defendant committed a murder. These cases, of course, 
do not involve judicialization nor declaring activist values because the courts only chose to 
side with traditional values. These two cases reflect a very important Chinese legal tradition 
that focus on the intent of the defender in criminal case, especially when it involves family 
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ethics. Furthermore, both cases happened during Wang Shengjun’s era, when Wang, as the 
head of the SPC, stressed the need to promote “social harmony”, and demanded courts to 
consider “feeling of the mass”53. Both judgments indeed have manifested the combination of 
traditional Chinese ethics as well as the Socialist values.   
 
Likewise, in Guiding Case No.21, an administrative litigation, the court pursues similar 
traditional values that are also shared by the Socialist regime. The main dispute of the case 
was about legal requirement for Air Defense Construction in newly constructed civilian 
buildings. According to Article 22 of the Civil Air Defense Law54, “In newly constructed 
civilian buildings in a city, basements that can be used for air defense during wartime [should 
be] constructed in accordance with relevant State provisions.” Thus, unless the law provides 
otherwise, such as low-rent housing and affordable housing, newly constructed civilian 
buildings in a city should bear such legal obligation. The issue in here is that neither law or 
regulations stipulate whether the ex situ construction should also fulfill such obligation. This 
has left a legislative blank for court to fill in. The court decided to side with traditional values 
that preventing a situation “where the cost of violating the law is less than the cost of obeying 
the law.” In order to elaborate this, the court’s reasoning delivered in a very old-fashion 
socialist argumentative manner: “this violates the legislative intent [of these provisions], and 
is not beneficial to safeguarding national defense and security or the fundamental interests of 
the people.55” The court thus uphold the government decision even though it may violate the 
                                                53	Susan	Trevaskes,	“Political	Ideology,	the	Party,	and	Politicking:	Justice	System	Reform	in	China”(2011)	37:3	Modern	China	315	at	317	 [Political	 Ideology];	 	 Zhang	 Taisu,	 “The	 Pragmatic	 Court:	 Reinterpreting	 The	 Supreme	 People’s	 Court	 of	 China”	 (2012)	 25	Columbia	Journal	of	Asian	Law	1	at	21	54	Also,	according	to	Article	48	of	the	Regulation	on	the	Administration	of	the	Construction	of	Civil	Air	Defense	Projects	states:	
Where	an	air	defense	basement	should	be	built	for	a	civilian	building	in	accordance	with	provisions,	but	due	to	geology,	topography,	or	
other	 factors,	 such	 construction	 is	 unsuitable,	 or	 where	 the	 prescribed	 construction	 area	 [of	 the	 basement]	 is	 smaller	 than	 the	
constructed	 area	 of	 the	 first	 floor	 of	 the	 civilian	 building,	 [an	 air	 defense	 basement]	 need	 not	 be	 built	 if	 it	 is	 so	 approved	 by	 the	
departments	in	charge	of	civil	air	defense.	However,	an	ex	situ	construction	fee,	[the	amount	of	which	is]	based	on	the	construction	cost	
needed	for	the	area	of	the	air	defense	basement	that	should	be	built,	must	be	paid,	and	the	departments	in	charge	of	civil	air	defense	
must	carry	out	the	ex	situ	construction	[of	the	air	defense	basement]	nearby.		55	“Inner	Mongolia	Qiushi	Real	Estate	Development	Limited	Liability	Company	v.	The	Civil	Air	Defense	Office	of	Hohhot	Municipality,	A	 Civil	 Defense	 Administrative	 Levy	 Case”,	 Guiding	 Case	 No.21,	 China	 Guiding	 Cases	 Project,	 Stanford	 Law	 School,	online:<https://cgc.law.stanford.edu/guiding-cases/guiding-case-21/>	
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principle of limited government by allowing government imposing monetary penalty on 
issues without clear legal authorization. 
 
Even in civil case where courts may have more autonomous room for discretion, court may 
also choose to accept traditional value during adjudication. For example, emphasizing on 
substantial equality over “formal equality” is one important conventional socialist and 
traditional Chinese values. The judgment of Guiding Case No. 72 has realized such 
institutional purposes through piercing the mask of freedom of contract, even though the 
court do evaluate the principle of freedom of contract in its judgment56.  
 
3.3.4 Activist Values 
Indeed, the term “activist” here is somewhat different than judicial activism in, say, the 
United State. The meaning of judicial activism in the US court highlight the tendency of 
court to act creatively against the original legislative intent57. The “activist” here, however, is 
a different concept that emphasize the values or policies that is progressively against the 
traditional values. To be more specific, these values are distance from those traditional values. 
On the one hand, pursuing these activist values often demand courts to actively work against 
traditional values or institutional interest of some other institutions.  On the other hand, more 
frequently, PRC courts often take advantage of legislative blank, which means to declare 
                                                56	The	 Guiding	 Case	No.72	 involves	 a	 loan	 agreement	 and	 a	 commercial	 residential	 property	 contract(商品房).	 The	 defendant,	 a	company,	 fail	 to	pay	back	the	 loan	from	the	plaintiff	 thus	they	agreed	to	 liquidate	the	property	owned	by	the	defendant.	Because	under	Chinese	law,	the	maximum	legitimate	amount	of	interest	of	loan	is	significantly	lower	than	liquidated	damages	generated	by	breaching	the	contract,	the	plaintiff	filed	a	litigation	against	the	defendant	for	default	in	order	to	realize	loan	interest	higher	than	the	legally	permissible	maximum.	The	high	People’s	Court	upheld	plaintiff’s	demand,	whereas	the	SPC	overturn	such	decision	with	the	reason	as	follows:	“…it	is	not	rare	that	a	party	change	her	mind	during	civil	transactions.	Such	change	shall	be	allowed	except	for	those	prohibited	by	special	law.	It	is	within	the	scope	of	the	principle	of	freedom	of	contract	that	[the	Court]	should	respect	parties’	will	 to	 unanimously	 change	 the	 nature	 of	 legal	 relationship	 afterwards.”	 However,	 the	 SPC	 then	 cross	 the	 fence	 of	 freedom	 of	contract	 to	examine	 the	cause	of	 such	change.	The	SPC	 found	 the	 liquated	damages	 in	property	contract	 is	a	veil	 to	 legalize	high	amount	of	loan	interest.	And	because	such	high	amount	of	loan	interest	shall	not	be	upheld	according	to	law,	thus	the	SPC	dismiss	the	application	 for	 the	 liquidated	damages	 from	the	plaintiff.	 In	short,	Guiding	Case	No.72	 is	an	excellent	example	demonstrating	how	Chinese	 court	 emphasize	more	weight	on	 traditional	 values.	Tanglong,	Liu	Xinlong,	Ma	Zhongtai,	Wang	Honggang	su	Xinjiang	
E’erduosi	Yanhai	Fangdichan	Kaifa	Youxiangongsi	 Shangpinfang	Maimaihetong	 Jiufen’an	 [Tang Long, Liu Xinlong, Ma Zhongtai 
and Wang Honggang v. Xinjiang Erdos Yanhai Real Estate Development Co., Ltd. Dispute over the Commercial 
Housing Sales Contract], Guiding Case No.72, Chinacourt.org, online:<http://www.court.gov.cn/zixun-xiangqing-27851.html> 57	See supra note 30	
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preferring public policy through filling in the legislative gap. In this sense, one may find 
many “activist values” are more closely related to Liberal-Rule of Law values as they held by 
courts in the North America and Europe, although differences of “Chinese characteristics” 
may exist in some occasion. Indeed, a large number of guiding cases actually have reflected 
these activist values and policies as their important institutional purposes. We could, thus, 
divide guiding cases reflecting activist values into two categories: The pursuit of activist 
values against traditional values held by administrative branches, and the activist values that 
fill in the legislative blank to promote preferring public policy that courts find desirable.  
 
The first category of activist values are those values that court pursue at the expense of 
administrative authority. These activist values separate themselves from the traditional 
Chinese and Socialist values held by government officials, such as bureaucratic convention 
and disrespect of due procedure. Indeed, there are numbers of administrative cases among 
Guiding Cases where Chinese courts striving for values at the expense of other government 
bodies. The Guiding Case No.26 is a proper example. In the case, the plaintiff, a citizen, has 
submitted an application for the disclosure of government information to defendant 
Department of Transport of Guangdong Province. The defendant, however, failed to reply or 
provide the government information [that the plaintiff] applied for within the time limit 
prescribed by law 58 , and thus [the plaintiff] seeks judicial ruling to confirm that the 
defendant’s act of failing to reply within the time limit prescribed by law was a violation of 
law. The defendant, claimed that this was because of the physical isolation of its 
departmental intranet from the Internet and the provincial extranet in court. The Basic Court 
of Yuexiu District of Guangzhou Municipality (Yuexiu Court), opined that the government’s 
claim could not stand. “As for the transfer of the application between the extranet and the 
                                                58 	According	 to	 Article	 24,	 Paragraph	 2	 of	 the	Regulation	 on	 Open	 Government	 Information	 of	 the	 People’s	 Republic	 of	
China	(“Regulation	on	Open	Government	Information”),	the	defendant	should	have	replied	to	the	plaintiff	by	15	working	days.	
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intranet and between the upper and lower level administrative organs, this is a type of internal 
management matter of administrative organs, and cannot be a ground [for justifying] an 
administrative organ’s deferred processing [of an application].” The court thus held that the 
defendant’s delay in issuing a reply should be recognized as a violation of law.  
 
In more sensitive cases (but still within the scope of ordinary case), Chinese courts was bold 
enough to declare activist values at the expanse of government authority. For example, 
Guiding Case No.41 involves the issue of demolition. In this case, the Quzhou Municipality 
Land Bureau planned to demolish plaintiff’s property in order to expand the place of a local 
bank. And it was on the way to be approved by the municipal government. The Land Bureau 
issued a notification to the plaintiff mentioning the name of Land Administrative Law, yet the 
notification did not specify which article fit in such situation. When the local court heard the 
case, the Land Bureau specify that the demolition was based on Article 58, Paragraph 1 of 
the Land Administration Law, [namely that] “the land use is needed for [a] public interest 
[purpose]” or “the land use needs to be adjusted for carrying out old town renovations to 
implement urban planning”. However, the court implied that expansion of local bank is not 
“public interest” nor “old town renovations59”. The court thus ruled that the justification for 
the government act is not sufficient and the government decision shall be revoked.  
 
Indeed, in China’s context, this is a bold move. Because the bank has been considered as part 
of the government for the long time since the era of planned economy. Even after the 1980s 
when China started to open and reform, the bank still enjoys privileged status in many 
circumstances. It is quite normal that a local bank requests the help from administrative body 
to accomplish many difficult tasks especially in some underdeveloped areas. And demolition 
                                                59	“Xuan	Yicheng	et	al.	v.	Bureau	of	Land	and	Resources	of	Quzhou	Municipality,	Zhejiang	Province,	A	Case	of	a	Recovery	of	the	Rights	to	 Use	 State-Owned	 Land”,	 Guiding	 Case	 No.41,	 China	 Guiding	 Cases	 Project,	 Stanford	 Law	 School,	online:<https://cgc.law.stanford.edu/guiding-cases/guiding-case-41/?lang=en>	
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for expansion of the banking hall in this case is one of the typical issues that a bank may ask 
for such assistance from government. In such scenario, we even do not have to mention 
empirical observations that there is wide connection between officials in government branch 
and personnel in state-owned institutions. But the court chooses to carefully strike down such 
joint action from local government and state-owned bank. As we may see from the judgement, 
every step the court made is closely based on law. “According to the Administrative 
Litigation Law of the People’s Republic of China and its related judicial interpretations, the 
defendant bears the burden of proof during administrative litigation [to justify] the specific 
administrative act that it carried out. [In situations] where the defendant does not provide 
evidence [that supported its specific administrative act] or the [legal] basis [upon which the 
defendant relied] when it carried out its specific administrative act, [a court] should 
determine that the specific administrative act did not have [the requisite] evidence and [legal] 
basis [to justify it]60.”  
 
On the other hand, some other guiding cases reflect courts’ creativeness while pursuing 
activist values while there is need to fill in legislative blank. Indeed, in numbers of guiding 
cases that court seized the opportunities to fill in legislative gap are civil cases, where courts 
enjoyed greatest autonomy to do so. One salient character in these cases were the courts 
actively decided on proper public policy for the society.  
 
In a recent guiding case, the Guiding Case No. 75, the Supreme Court has, on its own, 
established the criterial for standing for environmental case, an important, but one of the 
limited type of public interest litigation permitted in current China. Because the standard for 
                                                60	Ibid	
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standing of plaintiff is unclear in legislations61, in guiding case 75, the Supreme Court has, 
put forward a criterial for standing (susong zhuti) in environmental public litigation. 
According to court in the Guiding Case No.75, to affirm the standing of an organization as 
“social organization that specifically engage in environmental protection activity”, three 
conditions shall be met: (1) the purpose and scope of work of such organization should 
include public interest of conserving environment. (2) the organization should actually 
engage in such activities, and (3) such activities should have causality (guanlianxing) with 
purpose and scope of organization’s work. The court then, prescribed these three conditions 
in detail62. 
 
Equally impressive, in elaborating the first condition mentioned above, the Court actually 
cited an international treaty, the UN Convention on Biological Diversity, signed and ratified 
by Chinese authority63.  In other words, in order to pursue an activist institutional purpose, 
Chinese court set up a criterion by including international treaty in its reasoning. In this 
regard, the court has repeated what many other courts practice in elsewhere. 
 
Besides, there are numerous similar guiding cases pursuing activist values while there is need 
to fill in legislative blank. In case No.15, the court had applied academic principle of piercing 
the corporate veil by initializing the Paragraph 3 of Article 20 of the PRC Company Law64. 
                                                61	The	Chinese	environmental	civil	public	litigation	system	was	established	by,	though	coarsely,	the	Article	55	of	Civil	Procedure	Law	of	PRC,	Article	58	of	the	Environmental	Protection	Law,	and	Article	4	of	Interpretation	of	the	Environmental	Protection	Law.	62	Zhongguo	Shengwuduoyangxingbaohuyulvsefazhanjijinhui	su	ningxia	ruitaikejigufenyouxiangongsi	huanjingwuran	gongyisusong’an	[China Biodiversity Conservation and Green Development Foundation v. Ningxia Ruitai Science and Technology 
Co., Ltd.], Guiding Case No.75, Chinacourt.org, online:	Online:	<http://www.court.gov.cn/fabu-xiangqing-34322.html> 63	To	examine	whether	 the	plaintiff	 in	 the	case	meets	 the	 first	condition,	 in	addition	to	Environmental	Protection	Law,	a	domestic	law,	 the	 Court	 directly	 refer	 to	 the	UN	 treaty,	 by	 stating	 that	 the	 plaintiff ’s	 organizational	 purpose	 “has	 satisfied”(fuhe)	both	 the	domestic	law	and	international	treaty	Case.	64Paragraph	3	of	Article	20	of	 the	PRC	Company	Law	 states	 that,	 “Where	 the	 shareholder	of	 a	 company	abuses	 the	 independent	status	 of	 the	 company	 as	 a	 legal	 person	 or	 the	 limited	 liability	 of	 shareholders,	 evades	 debts	 and	 thus	 seriously	 damages	 the	interests	of	the	creditors	of	the	company,	he	shall	assume	joint	and	several	liabilities	for	the	debts	of	the	company.64”	In	this	case,	the	court	found	although	the	three	companies	in	this	case	were	registered	as	separate	enterprise	legal	persons	that	are	independent	of	each	other,	 they	 in	 fact	had	blurry	boundaries	and	commingled	personalities	among	 themselves…(thus)	seriously	harming	 the	interests	of	the	creditors.	The	aforementioned	conduct	violated	the	purpose	of	establishing	the	legal	person	system	and	violated	the	principle	of	good	faith.	The	nature	of	such	conduct	and	the	harmful	results	were	comparable	to	(相当)	the	situation	stipulated	in	
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Another example will be Guiding Case No. 17, a civil case where the court exploited 
legislative blank left by NPC and its Standing Committee to actively protect customer rights65. 
Likewise, in Guiding Case No.45, another civil case, the court established criteria to 
determine whether the allegedly infringing acts constituted unfair competition 66 . In 
                                                                                                                                                  Article	20,	Paragraph	3	of	the	Company	Law.	Thus,	by	referring	to（参照）	Article	20,	Paragraph	3	of	the	Company	Law,	the	court	found	the	three	company	bear	joint	and	several	liability	for	clearing	the	debts	of	the	creditors.		Indeed,	since	2005	when	the	Company	Law	of	PRC	has	been	passed,	the	theory	of	“piercing	the	corporate	veil”	has	been	put	 into	Article	 20.	 However,	 if	 the	 principle	 has	 been	 legislated,	 why	 the	 court	 in	 Case	 No.15	 used	 the	 word	 “comparable	 to”	 and	 “by	referring	to”	but	not	“according	to”	or	“in	accordance	with”?	In	order	to	answer	this	question,	we	should	briefly	note	that,	in	legal	theory	of	PRC	company	law,	there	are	three	conditions	should	be	met	in	order	to	“pierce”:	(1)	With	the	purpose	of	dodging	debts,	(2)	the	company	abuse	the	 independent	status	of	 legal	person	that	(3)	cause	seriously	harm	the	interest	of	creditors.	While	 in	actual	adjudications,	 (1)	 or	 (3)	 cause	 fewer	 disputes,	 (2)	 comparably	 receiving	more	 controversies	when	 comes	 to	 actual	 trial.	 This	 is	because	the	legislation,	Paragraph	3	of	Article	20	of	Company	Law	is	vague	about	how	violator“abusing	the	independent	status”.	In	other	words,	how	a	act	constitute	the	violation	of	“abusing	the	independent	status”?	There	were	no	speicifc	standard	rendering	by	the	legsialtion	passed	by	NPC.	However,	in	2003,			Article	51	of	the《SPC	Provisions	on	Several	Questions	of	Corporate	Disputes(1)	(Draft	 for	 Comment)(November	 2003),	 where	 the	 SPC	 has	 specified	 the	 key	 constitute	 “abusing	 the	 independent	 status”	 is	“commingling”	(混同),	or	more	specific,	“commingled	business”	(营业混同)	and	“commingled	finance”（财产混同）.	But	because	of	the	revision	of	Company	Law	in	2005,	the	SPC	2003	draft	has	never	been	passed.	Since	then,	the	standard	of	“commingling”	become	the	actual	standard	for	PRC	courts	to	decide	piercing	cases.	Interesting,	there	are	no	other	legal	documents	specified	the	principle	of	piercing	 the	 corporate	 veil.	 As	 we	 see	 in	 the	 judgment	 of	 No.15	 case,	 the	 court	 found	 that	 the	 defending	 three	 companies	 has	commingled	personnel,	commingled	finance	and	commingled	business.	It	is	thus	very	clear	that	the	court	does	apply	such	“internal	rule	that	made	by	the	SPC	on	its	own	into	the	case	where	the	legislation	left	the	blank	for	the	judiciary	to	fill	their	own	will	in.	This	case	has	further	demonstrated	that	PRC	court	has	very	high	initiatives	and	capacities	to	pursue	preferring	economic	policy	that	is	not	directly	related	to	their	self-interest	or	institutional	self-empowerment.	The	detail	of	the	Guiding	Case	No.15,	please	see	XCMG	Construction	Machninery	Co.,	Ltd.	V.	Chengdu	Chuanjiao	Industry	and	Trade	Co.,	Ltd.	Et	al.,	A	Sale	and	Purchase	Contract	Dispute,	Guiding	 Case	 No.15,	 China Guiding Cases Project, Stanford Law School, online:< https://cgc.law.stanford.edu/guiding-cases/guiding-case-15/>	65	In	this	case,	the	plaintiff,	a	customer,	had	purchased	a	car	from	the	defendant,	a	car-sell	company	which	promised	the	car	has	not	been	used	or	repaired	prior	to	sell.	But	after	purchase,	the	plaintiff	discovered	that	the	car	has	been	repaired	prior	to	sell,	she	then	brought	her	case	to	the	court.	During	the	trial,	the	seller	cannot	prove	that	it	has	performed	the	duty	to	disclose	this	repair	and	also	cannot	prove	such	status	has	been	acknowledged	by	the	consumer.	The	court	 then	rule	 that	 the	defendant’s	act	constitutes	sales	fraud	according	to	Article	2	and	Article	55,	Paragraph	1	of	the	Law	of	the	People’s	Republic	of	China	on	Protection	of	Consumer	Rights	
and	Interests	to	 the	 case,	 and	 orders	 the	 defendant	 to	 compensate	 the	 purchase	 plus	 a	 punitive	 compensation	 that	 doubles	 the	vehicle	purchase	amount.		
However,	this	is	different	than	the	original	legislative	intent.	While	looking	back	the	legislative	history	of	PRC	Customer	Protection	Law,	it	was	passed	in	1993	where	Chinese	society	was	still	in	a	relatively	undeveloped	status.	In	the	early	1990s,	an	epidemic	of	fake	commodity	and	agricultural	products	has	infected	most	part	of	the	country.	With	monetary	penalty,	Customer	Protection	Law	has	played	 its	 own	part	 in	 controlling	 forged	 and	 fake	 commodities	 in	China.	However,	 private	 cars	had	been	 regarded	 as	 luxurious	items	 since	 they	 were	 imported	 or	 even	manufactured	 in	 China	 since	 the	 1980s.	 	 But	 with	 China’s	 rapid	 developing	 economy,	private	cars	have	been	popularized	within	2	decades.		But	the	NPC	and	its	Standing	Committee	did	not	clearly	include	private	cars	into	the	coverage	of	Customer	Protection	Law.		
Thus,	although	it	is	not	the	first	civil	disputes	regarding	car	sale	that	the	court	has	step	in,	this	case	contains	an	obvious	incentive	that	court	has	filled	in	the	legislative	blank	by	making	rule	for	an	area	that	was	ambiguous	in	legislation.	And	the	SPC	select	this	case	into	the	quiver	of	Guiding	Case	6	year	later	than	its	actual	deliver	date	is	particularly	noteworthy	considering	previously	some	local	courts	had	refused	to	use	Customer	Protection	Law	in	dealing	with	Car-purchasing	disputes,	even	though	some	other	courts	may	acknowledge	the	application	of	Customer	Protection	Law	to	similar	disputes.		Until	today,	there	is	no	single	legislation	or	legislative	interpretations	was	 passed	 specified	 of	 car-purchase	 disputes,	 yet	 gradually	 the	 car-purchase	 disputes	was	 incorporated	 by	 the	Customer	protection	 law	 in	 recent	 year.	 For	 example,	 according	 to	 “Analysis	 on	Complaints	Accepted	by	Consumers	Associations	National	Wide	 in	2016”,	a	report	 issued	by	China	Costumers	Association,	 the	semi-government	organization,	now	suing	car-seller	based	on	Costumer	Protection	Law	become	everyday	scene	in	China.	For	the	Guiding	Case	No.17,	please	see	“Zhang	Li	v.	Beijing	Heli	Huatong	 Automobile	 Service	 Co.,	 Ltd.,	 A	 Sale	 and	 Purchase	 Contract	 Dispute”	 Guiding	 Case	 No.17,	 China	 Guiding	 Cases	 Project,	Stanford	Law	School,	online:	<https://cgc.law.stanford.edu/guiding-cases/guiding-case-17/>	For	the	Report	from	China	Costumers	Association,	please	see	China	Costumers	Association,	“2016nian	quanguo	xiaoxie	zuzhi	shouli	qichechanpin	 tousu	 qingkuang	 fenxi”(March	 18,	 2017),	 China	 Costumers	 Association,	 online:	<http://www.cca.org.cn/tsdh/detail/27277.html>	66	To	 be	 more	 specific,	 the	 Articles	 5	 to	 15	 of	 Chapter	 Two	 of	 the	Anti-Unfair	 Competition	 Law	 of	 the	 People’s	 Republic	 of	
China	(hereinafter	referred	to	as	the	“Anti-Unfair	Competition	Law”)	only	provide	a	list	of	acts	of	unfair	competition,	for	those	acts	not	listed	in	the	specific	provisions,	the	court,	based	on	“generally	recognized	business	ethics	and	common	understanding,	to	be	in	violation	 of	 the	 principles	 set	 forth	 in	 Article	 2	 of	 the	[Anti-Unfair	 Competition]	 Law”,	 has	 put	 forward	 a	 triadic	 standard	 to	determine	whether	an	act	of	a	business	operator	constitutes	unfair	competition:	(1)	[whether]	the	person	who	implements	the	act	is	a	business	operator	as	defined	by	the	Anti-Unfair	Competition	Law;	(2)	[whether]	the	business	operator,	not	following	the	principles	
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interpreting Patent Law in Guiding Case NO.20, again, the Court explored the blank of 
legislative intent when the Patent Law promulgated by the NPC is ambiguous regarding 
application of prior user rights67. In Guiding Case 53, on the issue of whether the right to 
proceeds associated with the concession right to operate a project such as a sewage treatment 
project could be pledged, the Legislation and other statutes did not provide any detail. The 
Court in this case, however, used judicial interpretation rather than legislative interpretation 
to establish the pledging of the right to proceeds from sewage treatment project68. Chinese 
court declares its preferring public policy purpose by taking advantage of legislative blank, 
again, in the foreign-related civil case in Guiding Case 37 in order to grant the plaintiff, a 
PRC company a type of unusual right of enforcement application69. Furthermore, if an issue 
under dispute is only remotely related to the administrative power, court may choose to act 
                                                                                                                                                  of	voluntariness,	 equality,	 fairness,	 and	good	 faith	when	engaging	 in	business	activities,	 violates	 the	provisions	of	 the	Anti-Unfair	
Competition	Law	and	 generally	 recognized	 business	 ethics;	 and	 (3)	 [whether]	 the	 business	 operator’s	 act	 of	 unfair	 competition	adversely	affects	the	legal	rights	and	interests	of	a	proper	business	operator.	Again,	in	trying	this	anti-competition	issue,	the	court	actively	 declares	 social-economic	 policy	 that	 to	 protect	 business	 ethics	 the	 court	 finds	 desirable	 in	 such	 situation.	 Beijing	Baidu	Netcom	Science	and	Technology	Co.,	Ltd.	V.	Qingdao	Aoshang	Network	Technology	Co.,	Ltd.	Et	al.,	An	Unfair	Competition	Dispute,	Guiding	 Case	 No.17,	China Guiding Cases Project, Stanford Law School, online:	 <https://cgc.law.stanford.edu/guiding-cases/guiding-case-45/>	67	The	Court	 opined	 that	 “…Otherwise,	 it	would	violate	 the	original	 legislative	 intent	of	 the	Patent	Law	by	providing	protection	 to	technical	 solutions	 that	 are	 not	 yet	made	public	 or	 patented.”	When	 the	 Law	provided	by	NPC	 is	 unclear,	 the	 court,	without	 any	hesitation,	filled	in	the	blank	of	Patent	Law:	“the	Patent	Law	provides	for	prior	user	rights…But	the	aforementioned	subsequent	acts	of	 exploitation	 cannot	 be	 determined	 to	 constitute	 infringements	merely	 because	 the	Patent	Law	does	 not	 have	 clear	 provisions.	Otherwise,	the	prior	user	rights	stipulated	by	the	Patent	Law	would	be	meaningless.	Shenzhen	Siruiman	Fine	Chemicals	Co.,	Ltd.	v.	Shenzhen	 Kengzi	 Water	 Supply	 Co.,	 Ltd.	 and	 Shenzhen	 Kangtailan	 Water	 Treatment	 Equipment	 Co.,	 Ltd.	 An	 Invention	 Patent	Infringement	 Dispute,	 Guiding	 Case	 No.17,	 China	 Guiding	 Cases	 Project,	 Stanford	 Law	 School,	Online:<https://cgc.law.stanford.edu/guiding-cases/guiding-case-20/>	68These	 judicial	 interpretations	 include:	 Article	 97	 of	 the	Interpretation	of	the	Supreme	People’s	Court	on	Several	Issues	Concerning	
the	Application	of	the	“Guarantee	Law	of	the	People’s	Republic	of	China”,	in	 order	 to	 transplant	 SPC’s	 institutional	 purposes	 to	 this	case.	 In	 this	 case,	 the	Guarantee	Agreement	 for	 the	Pledge	of	 the	Concession	Right	 to	Operate	of	 the	 sewage	 treatment	 project	 in	dispute	was	signed	in	2005.	The	laws,	administrative	regulations,	and	related	judicial	interpretations	at	that	time	did	not	provide	for	the	pledging	of	the	right	to	proceeds	from	a	sewage	treatment	project.	In	other	word,	the	legislation	has	been	silent	in	such	matter.	Under	such	circumstances,	the	court	took	the	liberty	to	pursue	desirable	social-economic	policy	again.	After	comparing	the	right	to	proceeds	 from	a	sewage	 treatment	project	and	 the	right	 to	proceeds	 from	a	highway,	 the	court	 finds	 they	are	 “similar	 in	nature”.	Thus,	the	court	allow	a	right	to	proceeds	from	a	sewage	treatment	[plant],	which	is	similar	to	[a	right	to	proceeds	from	a	highway],	be	pledged.	The	Fuzhou	Wuyi	Sub-Branch	of	Fujian	Haixia	Bank	Co.,	Ltd.	v.	Changle	Yaxin	Sewage	Treatment	Co.,	Ltd.	 	and	Fuzhou	Municipal	 Administration	 and	 Engineering	 Co.,	 Ltd.,	 A	 Dispute	 over	 a	 Financial	 Borrowing	 Contract,	 Guiding	 Case	 No.53,	 China	Guiding	Cases	Project,	Stanford	Law	School,	Online:<https://cgc.law.stanford.edu/guiding-cases/guiding-case-53/>	69According	 to	 the	 Civil	 Procedure	 Law	 of	 PRC	 and	 some	 other	 relevant	 statutes,	 in	 general,	 calculation	 of	 the	 enforcement	application	period	started	where	the	party	subject	to	enforcement	or	his	property	is	[located]	within	the	territory	of	China	when	an	effective	 legal	 document	 is	 rendered.	 The	 court	 thus	 be	 creative	 on	 the	 issue	 [concerning	 the	 time]	 from	which	 the	 enforcement	
application	period	in	this	case	[should	be]	calculated	when	the	party	subject	to	enforcement	or	its	property	is	not	[located]	within	the	territory	of	 the	People’s	Republic	of	China	where	PRC	courts	did	not	have	enforcement	 jurisdiction	over	 that	case.	Therefore,	 the	court	opined	that	“an	enforcement	applicant’s	time	limit	[within	which	he	must]	apply	for	enforcement	should	be	calculated	from	the	date	on	which	[such]	enforcement	 jurisdiction	 is	confirmed,	 that	 is,	 the	date	on	which	the	property	available	 for	enforcement	[belonging	 to]	 the	 party	 subject	 to	 enforcement	 is	 discovered”	 Shanghai	 Jwell	Machinery	 Co.,	 Ltd.	 and	Retech	Aktiengesellschaft,	Switzerland,	 AN	 Enforcement	 Reconsideration	 Case	 on	 an	 Abrbitral	 Award,	 Guiding	 Case	 No.37,	 China	 Guiding	 Cases	 Project,	Stanford	Law	School,	online:	<https://cgc.law.stanford.edu/guiding-cases/guiding-case-37/?lang=en>	
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more boldly.  In Guiding Case No. 30, a civil case70, the court had enshrined the philosophy 
of legal right to turn down the defendant’s claim which is indeed one of the very classic 
Chinese traditional philosophy that mingled morality and rights, that a person morally liable 
shall not deserve of legal protection.  
 
On the other hand, in some guiding cases, Chinese courts have taken advantage of legislative 
blank to declare preferring values when strike down administrative decision. In Guiding Case 
No. 76, for instance, the Court had found its own legal reason to decide an administrative 
contract before the legislation came out. In the old form of Administrative Litigation Law of 
PRC(ALL, the original version was promulgated in 2000), whether “administrative contract”
（xingzheng xieyi） is justiciable remained as a question. Under such circumstance, the 
Basic People’s Court of Anyuan District of Pingxiang Municipality in Jiangxi Province 
(Anyuan Court) not only accepted the case, but also stated that “the interpretation made by 
administrative bodies within its authority should bind both parties on the administrative 
contract. According to concrete circumstance, [the court] may use it as the basis for 
reviewing administrative contract71”. In the case, the plaintiff, a property developer had 
entered a contract with Land and Resources Bureau of Ping Zhou Municipality. The purpose 
of the contract was to transfer a land to the plaintiff. According to the contract, the nature of 
the land is “commercial-residential”, but while the land certificate was issued by the 
defendant, the nature had been changed into “industrial”. The plaintiff then sought to resume 
the original nature of land into “Commercial-residential”. With the refusal from the defendant, 
the plaintiff turned to Planning Bureau of the Municipality. After the Planning Bureau’s 
                                                70Lan	Jianjun	and	Hangzhou	Suremoov	Automotive	Tecnology	Company	Limited	v.	Tianjin	Xiaomuzhi	Automobile	Maintenance	and	Repair	Services	Co.,	Ltd.	et	al.,	A	Trademark	Infringement	and	Unfair	Competition	Dispute,	Guiding	Case	No.30,	China	Guiding	Cases	Project,	Stanford	Law	School,	online:	<https://cgc.law.stanford.edu/guiding-cases/guiding-case-30/?lang=en>	71	Pingxiangshi	yapeng	fangdichan	kaifa	youxiangongsi	su	pingxiangshi	guotuziyuanju	bulvxing	xingzhengxieyi’an	 [Pingxiang	 Yapeng	Real	 Estate	 Development	 Co.,Ltd.	 V.	 Land	 and	 Resources	 Bureau	 of	 Pingxiang	 City], Guiding Case No.76, Chinacourt.org, Online:	<http://www.court.gov.cn/fabu-xiangqing-34322.html>	
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involvement by issuing an interpretation that the land should be “commercial-residential” ab 
initio, the Land and Resources Bureau agreed to change the nature of land, yet it requested 
the plaintiff to repay “land-transferring fees”. The case was thus brought by the plaintiff into 
the Anyuan Court in order to (1) seek change the nature of the land, and (2) revoke the 
administrative decision for the repayment of “land-transferring fees” contingent on the 
change of the land nature. The Anyuan Court upheld the plaintiff on the following grounds: 
(1) Administrative Contract should underlie the principle of good faith, equality and 
voluntariness…administrative body shall not increase obligation for the other party, or 
unitarily modify or terminate the contract. (2) The Interpretation issued by Planning Bureau 
fell within its scope of authority, and is conducive to the image of integrity of the 
government…and it legally bind the decision regarding the nature of the land. Thus, the 
Basic Court decide to discharge the administrative decisions of the defendant on the ground 
of legality and the principle of good faith. The Intermediate Court had sustained the decision 
of Anyuan Court after the government appealed72. 
 
Even in criminal cases, where the traditional values usually prevail, PRC courts may still 
declare public policy by taking advantage of legislative blank. For example, in Guiding Case 
61, in determining what constitute “the circumstances are serious” and “the circumstances are 
especially serious” of the crime of using undisclosed information for transaction”, a gap left 
by NPC, the SPC sought to interpret legislative intent of Criminal Law.  In particular, the 
SPC even took the place of NPC or its Standing Committee while explaining why the Article 
180 quote penalty provisions from other articles. According to the SPC “the purpose for 
quoting penalty provisions from other articles is because [the legislators] avoid repeatedly 
express, and it is in no case because the provisions are unclear.” In short, the SPC opined, 
                                                72	Ibid	
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“although the Section 4 of Article 180 do not explicitly contain ‘the circumstances are 
especially serious’, it should be included” because of “legislative intent, the meaning of the 
provisions and legislative technique.73” In other words, the SPC has on its own, form a quasi-
provision to fill a legislative blank while the NPC or its Standing Committee’s original 
scheme may not actually contain such “legislative intent”.    
 
2.1.6 Restraining Values  
According to our model, the third type of preferring values is restraining value. The term 
“restraining” in here refers to the idea that Chinese courts voluntarily “step back” from 
judicializing new area to declare public policies for the society, even if they do have the 
chance. In such scenario, the reason for being “restraining” is for the sake of social and 
institutional autonomy, a special preferring value.  Certainly, comparing with other guiding 
cases, cases reflecting such “restraining values” in guiding cases system are smaller in 
number. 
 
Indeed, the Guiding Case No.10 may be seen as a typical example, where the courts chose to 
move back from the issues that it could have been judicialized. The plaintiff in this case, a 
general manager claimed that, a resolution that the defendant, Jiapower Company used to 
dismiss the plaintiff from his post as general manager was based on facts and reasons that 
could not stand, and the board of directors’ procedure for convening, its method of voting, as 
well as the contents of its resolution all violated the provisions of the Company Law of PRC. 
He requested that the court revoke the board of directors’ resolution in accordance with law74. 
Thus, the key in this case is whether the court should review a resolution made by broad of 
                                                73	Male	 liyong	 Weigongkaixinxi	 jiaoyi’an	 [Case concerning Ma Le's Trading by Using Undisclosed Information], Guiding Case 
No.61, Chinacourt.org, Online:	<http://www.court.gov.cn/fabu-xiangqing-27541.html> 74	Li	 Jianjun	 v.	 Shanghai	 Jiapower	 Environment	 Protection	 Science	 and	 Technology	 Co.,	 Ltd.,	 A	 Corporate	 Resolution	 Revocation	Dispute,	 Guiding	 Case	 No.10,	 China	 Guiding	 Cases	 Project,	 Stanford	 Law	 School,	 online:	 <https://cgc.law.stanford.edu/guiding-cases/guiding-case-10/>	
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directors in a Shanghai Company when the plaintiff seeks judicial intervention from the court 
to overturn the defendant’s resolution that discharge his duty in the company. While the 
Basic Court upheld the plaintiff, the Intermediate Court in the Second Instance revoked the 
Basic Court’s decision, dismissing the plaintiff with the ground that the courts should respect 
the corporate autonomy with the following ground: “in principle, judiciary do not intervene 
in internal corporate affairs.”75. 
 
In another administrative case, the Guiding Case 39, the court, once again, voluntarily 
stepped back from academic autonomy when it has the chance to judicialize the issue to 
promote preferring public policy. The plaintiff was a graduate of the undergraduate program 
in the defendant, a university in China. However, the defendant refused to confer the bachelor 
degree on the plaintiff based on the Detailed Implementing Rules of Undergraduate program 
that issued by the defendant itself. The plaintiff thus filed an administrative litigation against 
the defendant. Both courts in the First and Second Instances had rejected the litigation request 
of the plaintiff.  
 
The court opined that each higher education institution enjoys academic autonomy. 
Academic autonomy allows the higher education institution to “determine its own measuring 
standards for the requisite academic levels for bachelor’s degree conferral, in accordance 
with its teaching level and actual circumstances and within the scope of basic statutory 
principles”. Thus, on such premise, the higher education institution has autonomy to set their 
own standards to confer bachelor degree based on its own philosophy of how to run its school, 
actual teaching situations, and [its] pursuit of the ideal of [achieving high] academic levels.76” 
The court concludes that legality review is the principle for conducting judicial review of an 
                                                75	Ibid	76	He	Xiaoqiang	v.	Huazhong	University	of	Science	and	Technology,	A	Case	of	a	Refusal	to	Confer	a	Degree,	Guiding	Case	No.39,	China	Guiding	Cases	Project,	Stanford	Law	School,	online:	<https://cgc.law.stanford.edu/guiding-cases/guiding-case-10/>	
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education institution’s act of conferring a degree. “Judicial review of the conferral of 
bachelor’s degrees must not interfere with or influence the principle of higher education 
institutions’ academic autonomy. Legality review should be the basic principle for 
[determining] the scope of judicial review in administrative litigation cases [involving] 
degree conferral.77” Thus, again, when the court has both the potential power and opportunity 
to declare desirable public policy for judicialize such matters, the court, voluntarily, chose to 
back down. Indeed, restraining value is a particular but salient type of institutional purpose, 
which had been shared by numbers of mature judiciaries in the world. However, in China’s 
context, such value had not begun its development until recent years. In this regard, 
restraining values reflected by guiding cases the current Chinese courts are pursuing. This is 
indeed a noteworthy development. Even more noteworthy is that Guiding Case No. 39 was 
delivered long before it was collected by the guiding cases system. And this has somewhat 
demonstrated the vision of the institutional purposes of SPC itself, a supreme court in the 
probably most complex authoritarian environment in the world.  
 
4. Main Empirical Observations: A Brief Comparison with Hyper-Political Cases  
 
In this part, we will explore institutional purposes in hyper-political cases which are vastly 
different than them in the ordinary cases, although they do share some similarity regarding 
their institutional purposes. We then compare institutional purposes between guiding cases 
and these selected hyper-political cases to present our empirical findings from guiding cases 
that could validate our theoretical model.  
 
4.1 Exploration of Courts’ institutional purposes in three Hyper-Political Cases 
                                                77	Ibid	
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For the purpose to compare guiding cases, we have chosen another important type of cases in 
China, the hyper-political cases, as “control group” for contrast of ordinary justices. To be 
more specific, among hyper-political cases, “Xu Zhiyong” case in 2014, “Pu Zhiqiang” case 
in 2015 and “Zhang Rongping” case in 2016 are particularly important.  First, they represent 
different social identities of people subject to hyper-political trials.78 Second, they represent 
different “social classes” within those unwelcomed and suppressed by the authoritarian 
regime79. Along with some other hyper-political cases, from the perspective of institutional 
purposes, some preliminary observations could be found in judgments of hyper-political 
cases. In general, in hyper-political cases Chinese courts have strong tendency to protect self-
interest and institutional integrity.  
 
First, from our observation, the text of these judgments tends to be very detailed, which 
probably would be the first impression for anyone reading these judgments. In general, these 
political trials come with judgments that are very long in text with over 10000 characters in 
Chinese. Comparing with guiding cases collected and issued by the SPC, this length is quite 
rare and unusual. Indeed, the most important reason accounting for such extraordinary length 
are because the evidence collected by prosecutors and recognized by courts are quite detailed. 
For example, in Pu Zhiqiang case, originally the prosecutor prepared over 30 pieces of Weibo 
                                                78	Pu	Zhiqiang	is	an	critical	lawyer	mainly	defending	political	sensitive	cases	such	as	cases	involving	torture	and	excessive	detention.	Xu	Zhiyong	is	an	social	campaign	chief	organizer	and	in	Charge	of	a	civil	right	NGO,	named	“Citizen	Movement”	or	“Gongmeng”	in	Chinese.	He	holds	a	law	doctoral	degree	from	Peking	University.	Zhang	Rongping,	on	the	other	hand,	is	an	individual	activist	who,	on	his	own,	seeks	to	overturn	the	Party/State	by	inciting	people	via	Internet	and	public	protest	in	person.	Thus,	they	each	represent	critical	lawyer,	civil	right	NGO	organiser/	social	movement	leader,	and	individual	activists.	When	PRC	they	have	been	sent	to	courts	by	 the	 Party/State,	 as	we	will	 demonstrate,	 their	 cases	 have	manifested	 important	 basic	 social	 logic,	 institutional	 dynamics	 and	“judicial	diplomacy	of	PRC	courts	under	the	authoritarian	rule.		79	Pu	himself	is	a	successful	lawyer	who	has	awarded	many	high-class	rewards	and	honors	for	fighting	both	political	cases	and	other	normal	cases,	and	he	is	economically	successful	as	well.	Both	Xu	and	Pu	are	famous	internationally	and	domestically.	Xu	was	famous	for	he	has	submitted	a	petition	 to	call	 for	abolish	 the	system	of	 reforming	 through	 labor	with	other	 two	scholars	when	he	was	a	doctoral	candidate	in	Peking	University.	He	then	became	a	lecturer	in	a	University	in	Beijing	and	earned	reputation	mainly	among	legal	academic	circle.	His	career	as	social	campaign	organizer	has	somewhat	successful	 in	the	2000s	until	his	NGO	Gongmeng	has	been	banned	in	2009.	But	this	has	not	seriously	impaired	his	reputation	as	civil	right	NGO	leader.	However,	unlike	these	two	figures,	Zhang	Rongping	is	like	“nobody”.	He	always	protested	in	public	and	expressed	his	political	online	totally	on	his	own.	He	has	no	staff,	and	no	funding	for	promoting	his	political	opinions.	According	to	his	 judgment,	 the	most	“influential”	platform	he	got	was	his	QQ	Space	which	only	hundreds	of	followers	and	three	thousand	viewing.	He	could	be	ascribed	as	“lower	class”	in	list	of	“unwelcomed	people”	of	 the	PRC	regimes,	 comparing	with	other	 two	enjoying	higher	 “social	 status”	and	popular	attention.	Thus,	we	deliberate	select	these	cases	for	examining	if	there	are	difference	exist	for	how	PRC	courts	deal	with	these	cases.	
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published by Pu as evidences, although they had shortened to 7 pieces during the trial80. In 
Xu Zhiyong case, likewise, the police and prosecutors had collected over 200 pieces of 
testimony, although a large part of them are hearsays81. From the perspective of our theory, 
our speculation would be twofold. First, the courts, as TDR institution, have their own 
institutional logic even though they are under authoritarian context. As many have written, 
adjudicating political case provide some degree of legitimacy for the authoritarian regimes82. 
To a large extent, adjudicating political cases according to normative structure is an 
important feature that separate current Chinese courts from the camp of very definition of 
totalism.  
 
However, if we further shift our point of view from traditional “functional perspective” to 
institutional view, we found that authoritarian courts such as Chinese courts still have their 
institutional purposes in political sensitive cases. In our selected hyper-political cases, courts’ 
prolonged procedure for examining evidence during trials is indeed one important way for 
courts to expand their authority. For one thing, court going through such procedure might be 
able to show the Party/State that normative structure is the key to legalize political 
suppression. On the other hand, the authority of court, as we have noted, lies in the image of 
neutral triadic dispute resolvers that adjudicate matters “according to law”. Without this, 
there would be no legitimacy for foundation of judicial power. Thus, to include extraordinary 
detail of evidence and analysis thereof is also a way to exert authority of court toward the 
plaintiff and defendant in the political trials and, by extension, the society as well. Admittedly, 
in trying hyper-political cases, authoritarian courts are unable to perform the genuine TDR 
                                                80	Zheping	 Huang,	 “The	 Seven	 Tweets	 that	 could	 cost	 a	 Chinese	 human	 rights	 lawyer	 eight	 years	 in	 Jail”(Dec.9,	 2015)	 Online:	<https://qz.com/569370/the-seven-tweets-that-could-cost-a-chinese-human-rights-lawyer-eight-years-in-jail/>	81See	Xu	Zhiyong’s	Judgment:	Criminal	Judgment	(2013)	yizhongxingchuzi	No.	5268,	The	First	Intermediate	People’s	Court	of		Beijing	Municipality	82	See	 for	 example,	 Zhang	Qianfan,	 “The	People's	Court	 in	Transition:	The	prospects	of	 the	Chinese	 judicial	 reform”	 (2003)	12:34	Journal	 of	 Contemporary	 China	 69	 at	 71,	 77	 [Court	 in	 Transition];	 Carl	 Minzner,	 “Judicial	 Disciplinary	 Systems	 for	 Incorrectly	Decided	Cases:	The	Imperial	Chinese	Heritage	Lives	on”	(2009)	39	N.	M.	L.	Rev.	63	at	83-84	
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function and prevent from pursuing their preferring policy as they did in the ordinary cases. 
In China, the powerful Party/State has demanded courts to perform social controlling 
function in these trials. In such circumstance, the Chinese courts actually do not jeopardize 
the laws. Indeed, it adjudicate ACCORDING TO LAW, at least it tries to establish the image 
that it does follow the law, even though the legislative intent behind the legislation is 
questionable from the liberal-democratic standard. Intentionally or unintentionally, it actually 
passes the buck to the authoritarian regime, the government or even the Party. Because when 
the courts’ acts are in pure legal realm, it actually avoids taking any ethic risk about the 
political crack down engaging by authoritarian regime. To some degree, the logic of Chinese 
courts in these circumstances is still in line with its counterpart which judge according to 
legislation. But courts obviously have calculated their institutional interests that are different 
than the Party/State. They may care much about their reputation and legitimacy than the rest 
of the authoritarian governing machine because their fundamental institutional logic depends 
on it. In short, the PRC courts actually act strategically in order to protect their institutional 
authority and integrity as much as possible in the case of hyper-political trials.  
 
On the other hand, it is not difficult to see from these three cases that the Party/State has left 
the discretion of penalty to the courts. While in most cases the courts would still behave 
within the expectation of authoritarian rulers, occasionally the courts use it as the invaluable 
windows of opportunity to pursue their own interest and values. Maybe the most important 
example would be Pu Zhiqiang’s trial. In the case, the court had considered the defending 
attorney of Pu, that sentence three-year imprisonment of Pu with probation. Because of Pu’s 
domestic impression and international reputation, the Party/State is compromised and fine 
with the penalty.  
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Furthermore, in some occasions, the court may take the opportunity to express civil rights 
and constitutional rights when the defending lawyer fed them with these constitutional 
articles and principles in these hyper-political cases. For example, since these cases all 
involves freedom of speech, the courts did make constitutional statement before the window 
of opportunity shut down. In Pu Zhiqiang, Zhang Rongping and Xu Zhiyong case, the court 
stresses repeatedly that citizens in China has the right of speech and freedom of expression, 
but these should be exercised within the framework of state laws. In this regard, we have to 
particularly consider that there is no constitutional review in China, and the PRC Constitution 
remains unjudiciable and be forbidden to be cited in actual cases. 
 
In short, in these hyper-political cases, three important observations could be made regarding 
institutional purposes PRC courts have in hyper-political cases: (1) Obviously, under high 
political pressure, and considering there are no life tenure or similar institutional shield to 
guarantee incumbency for Chinese judges, they are undoubtedly care much about self-interest 
in trying hyper-political cases. This could be reflected by the facts the courts in hyper-
political cases usually side with Party/State in substantial judgment. Because even rational 
and empirical assumption may be able to infer a judge may be subject to career disadvantage 
or even worse penalty once adjudicate hyper-political cases against the authoritarian order. 
Thus, this almost never happen. (2) The courts trying hyper-political cases, however, reflect a 
strong tendency to preserve institutional integrity, which centers on the image of a qualified 
triadic dispute resolving institution, the image of remain neutral TDR mechanism. (3) 
Occasionally the courts in hyper-political cases may pursue limited normative values or even 




4.2. Main Empirical Findings and analysis on Institutional Purposes of SPC Guiding 
Cases  
 
With hyper-political cases as contrast group, let us revisit these guiding cases. In summary, 
we have found that empirical data drawing from the Guiding Cases has basically confirmed 
our theoretical assumptions.  
 
4.2.1 Self-Interest and Institutional-Interest 
In these Guiding Cases, we could see that both the self-interest and Institutional Interest has 
played their intrinsic part in shaping institutional purposes of judicial behaviors. On the one 
hand, Chinese courts, just as courts in elsewhere, are institutions consist of judges. A judge is 
just ordinary individual in essence, a collection of varied kind of self-interests such as career 
advancement, workload, material treatment and reputation. These self-interests may even 
determine the results of cases, and has been semi-officially recognized by the SPC, just like 
the Guiding Case No.51 has revealed.   
 
On the other hand, judicial behaviors in a number of guiding cases also have demonstrated 
the trace of institutional interest. In these guiding cases, we have found that expanding the 
judicial power, social-political status is in the center of institutional purposes. The most 
common ones may include expanding judicial power of review and strengthening “devices” 
of courts such as enforcement mechanism. As manifested by guiding cases, they may be 
achieved by exploiting legislative blank, self-empowering at the expanse of administrative 
authority, or sometimes just by directly intruding the social realm.  
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Indeed, one potential but important problem for examining institutional purpose is 
institutional purposes may be very hard to identify. This is first because court system in 
China, a country with vast regional diversity, comprises of over three thousand courts. In 
particular, there are four tiers of court in PRC judicial system, which include SPC, provincial 
level High People’s Court, municipal level Intermediate People’s Court and the Basic 
People’s Court in county and district of city. Although courts may share some similar 
purposes as judicial institution, each one is very likely to have their own agenda. For example, 
the SPC probably have different consideration than, say, an intermediate court. On the other 
hand, the fact that courts are judges’ courts make the situation more complicated. Every 
judge, even in the same court, generally have their own interests and preference for different 
matters. Indeed, these differences have not only brought obstacles for researchers like us to 
examine, but in practice this problem baffled the PRC courts themselves. Institutional/self-
interests and preferring values have great possibility to be overlapped and difficult to separate 
in the real world. Moreover, for judges, not only their public policy preferences, but also their 
preferences of public policy and normative policy may conflict from time to time. In such 
circumstances, courts may have to carefully select their goals and act strategically to achieve 
them.  In short, these interests may overlap, and the divergence of self-interest of judges and 
institutional-interest of courts often blurs in actual cases.  
 
How to reconcile or mitigate such obstacle in our research? In theory, Institutionalism 
suggest that individuals are not atomistic but rather are embedded in a complex series of 
relationships with other individuals and with collectivities83. Their personal preferences are 
                                                83	For	example,	one	 important	school	of	 institutionalism	is	rational-choice	 institutionalism.	Rational	choice	theory	depends	 for	 its	analytical	 power	 upon	 the	 utility-maximizing	 decisions	 of	 individuals,	 but	 they	 differentiate	 themselves	 from	 the	 school	 of	behaviorism	from	understanding	clearly	that	most	political	life	to	expand	self-interest	does	occur	within	institutions.	See	supra	note	9	at	47	
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both exerted and constrained by the institution84. Further, membership in an institution tends 
to be a valuable commodity for those who do belong. Membership is also capacity of an 
institution to enforce their standards85 . Thus, institutional theory highlights the fact that 
institutional characters of courts, such as institutional structure, cohesion and variation, or 
even a small variation in the institutional configuration 86 , would impact the member’s 
behavior (and by extension, institutional behavior) to a varying degree. Nevertheless, in 
practice, it is impossible to capture all these different interests and preferences. This is 
because, for example, a simple result may come from numerous institutional features or 
environmental changes.  
 
Thus, methodological individualism would be an important complementary for institutional 
perspective. Originally, it argues that only actors in political settings are individuals, and 
therefore the only appropriate foci for political inquiry are individuals and their behaviors87. 
In here, we take a more moderate ground to use behavioral and individual approach to focus 
on attitudes of individual judges, which could provide background and information for 
understanding the court as institution88. In addition, the behavioral/individual can be clearly 
linked with rational/utilitarian term to assume that individual act to maximize their personal 
self-interest. Thus, interviewing numbers of judges and other officials will be necessary89. 
Nevertheless, all models necessarily simplify the complex reality. That simplification, 
                                                84	From	 the	viewpoint	of	 rational-choice	 institutionalism,	 “utility	maximization”	 could	only	be	 “achieved	most	effectively	 through	institutional	action”,	and	member’s	behavior	in	the	institution	is	shaped	by	the	institutions.	Thus,	“individuals	rationally	choose	to	be,	to	some	extent,	constrained	by	their	membership	in	institutions,	whether	that	membership	is	voluntary	or	not.”	Ibid	at	49	85	The	 viewpoint	 of	 “Normative	 Institutionalism”	 suggest	 that	 Normative	 Compliance,	 therefore,	 is	 central	 to	 the	 functioning	 of	institutions	 from	 this	 theoretical	 perspective.	 The	 source	 of	 compliance	 then	 is	 derived	 from	 a	 normative	 commitment	 to	 the	institution	and	its	purposes.	It	may	also,	however,	become	habitualized	and	routinized	so	that	conscious	commitment	and	conscious	decision-making	are	minimized.	Ibid	at	39,	41	86	Supra	 Tom	Ginsburg,	 Judicial	Review	in	New	Democracies:	Constitutional	Courts	in	Asian	Cases	 (New	York:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2003)	at	251	87	Supra	note	9	at	14	88	This	is	because,	the	weakness	of	attitudinal	approach	is	obvious.	As	Shapiro	has	noted,	“weaknesses	for	the	attitudinal	research	is	that	the	behavior	under	another	name	becomes	its	own	explanation.	At	best	this	method	is	tautological.”	Even	obtaining	attitudes	from	group	behavior	such	as	group	voting	we	may	encounter	similar	difficulties.	This	 is	because	even	all	 judges	vote	unanimous	together	on	the	same	issues,	their	attitudes	toward	a	policy	or	issue	may	still	not	the	same.	See	supra	note	11	at	40-41	89	But	this	might	generate	extra	difficulties.	For	example,	it	is	a	general	knowledge	that	in	China,	both	courts	and	judges	probably,	in	official	 occasions,	will	 deny	 they	have	 “made	 law”.	They	might	 assert	 that	 they	merely	observe	and	 follow	 legislative	will.	This	 is	understandable	considering	the	PRC	is	a	civil	law	country	officially	enshrining	the	orthodoxy	principle	of	parliamentary	supremacy.	
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however, creates the risk that some essential aspect of the process or phenomenon under 
study will be lost90. In applying attitudinal approach to our study, we must note that there 
may always be gap between judges’ actual motivations and motivations that we could 
observe. This is one observational bias that we may encounter and not that easily to get rid of.  
 
In our research, we tend to make a compromise by seeking for the best common place 
between higher courts and lower courts, between judges and the courts. Just like “screen 
shot”, we seek to capture at least many common preferences shared by most rational courts in 
one specified time and space. The best effort we could do is to strike the balance between 
bahavioralism or institutionalism to discover common interests and purpose of them 91 . 
Bahavioralism suggest that we should pay attention to individual behaviors within institution, 
while institutionalism corrected behavioralism by focusing on how formal and informal rules 
and procedures influence, constrain, and sometimes even determine what individual actors’ 
behaviors within the institution92. Nevertheless, the SPC still deserve our special attention 
because SPC’s extremely special position in judicial system and important status in China’s 
polity.  
 
4.2.2 Traditional, Activist and Restraining Values  
As hypothesized by our model, as for the preferring values, we divide them into three 
categories: traditional, activist and restraining. 
 
First, empirical observation on guiding cases could reveal that it is quite often that Chinese 
courts side with traditional values. Although the selection of cases tends to make them 
                                                90	Supra	note	16	at	442	91	In	 this	 regard,	 the	 “rational	 choice	 institutionalism”	might	 be	 good	 for	 reference.	 This	 version	 of	 the	 rational	 choice	 approach	conceptualizes	institutions	as	aggregations	of	rules	with	members	of	the	organizations-or	institutions-agreeing	to	follow	those	rules	in	exchange	for	such	benefits	as	they	are	able	to	derive	from	their	membership	within	the	structure.	Supra	note	9	at	52	92	See	supra	note	10	at	10;	To	explore	more,	see	supra	note	1		
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“meaningful” for courts’ reference, we still could find in numbers of cases the courts support 
traditional Chinese philosophy and Socialist values. For example, the two murder cases as 
noted above have been mingled application of modern law with traditional Confucian ethics. 
In another administrative case, the court chose to side with the socialist values. 
 
Second, and perhaps more often than traditional values, activist values manifest themselves 
in a large part of guiding cases. Activist values are distance from or even against traditional 
values. Pursuit of these activist values often demand courts to actively work against 
traditional values or institutional interest of some other institutions. Such activist values share 
more resemblance with Liberal-Rule of Law values as enshrined in the Western world. As we 
have demonstrated, from demolition case to company issues, from administrative reply to 
environmental public litigation, from foreign-related civil enforcement to patent law, Chinese 
court indeed act very much as its counterpart in the world to declare preferring public policy, 
at least for the guiding cases.    
 
Finally, we also have found a special type of values, the “restraining values” exists in guiding 
cases. The term “restraining” means that the court voluntarily pulls back from judicializing 
social-economic issues for the sake of protecting social autonomy, even though society is the 
realm that the courts feel most comfortable to deal with. In commercial dispute as the 
Guiding Case No. 10, the courts sacrificed the chance to judicialize social-economic issue for 
expanding judicial power because “corporate autonomy” is a value that the court jealously 
respect and protect. In another case, Guiding Case No. 17, the courts, again, voluntarily kept 
distance from the autonomy of university to protect “academic freedom”.  
 
4.2.3 Judicialization and Binding Effects of Guiding Cases 
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Indeed, in numbers of Guiding Cases the judicial power has pushed forward to concur new 
territory. This means, judicialized process occurred. In these cases, Chinese courts push 
forward to conquer new areas where have not been touched and through guiding cases system 
they have been formally recognized by the SPC, which is both the Supreme Court and the 
highest administrative organ in Chinese courts system.  
 
Indeed, many of the guiding cases involve judicialization. Indeed, judicialization is an 
excellent entry point to examine institutional purposes of PRC courts. However, the 
prototypic conception of judicialization is somewhat problematic because it has tangled with 
normative meanings. First, the prototypic definition of “judicialization” implies that only 
political development would invite judicialization93, which closely link with judicialization of 
politics. However, it neglects the fact that social-economic development also would provide 
enough materials and needs for judicialized process, as these guiding cases have 
demonstrated94. Second, there is a general assumption that judicialization is possible only the 
prerequisite of Liberal-democratic version of judicial independence is achieved. However, 
modern courts may not be truly independent if considering their roles as rule maker and 
social controller95. Nevertheless, we may step back and take a more moderate position to 
redefine the conception of judicialization. That is, judicialization simply means to 
institutionally bring dyadic disputes under the remit of the courts. Simply put, after largely 
neutralizing the normative ideological meaning of the conception, judicialization is a means 
                                                93	Under	such	“prototypic	definition”,	the	judicialization	of	politics	is	the	process	by	which	triadic	lawmaking	progressively	shapes	the	strategic	behavior	of	political	actors	engaged	in	interactions	with	one	another.	supra	note	12	at	164	94	However,	obviously,	the	scope,	objective,	and	power	for	such	judicialized	process	in	social-economic	affairs	may	be	different	than	the	“typical”	judicialization	of	politics.	95	In	 the	 US,	 for	 example,	 the	 bureaucratic	 nature	 of	 Federal	 Judiciary	 make	 it	 could	 potentially	 be	 rigged	 by	 electoral	 politics.	Common	way	for	rigging	Federal	Justices	is	to	change	the	structure	of	courts.		This	may	include	entrenching	ideological	bias	in	the	newly	created	court	or	 introducing	“Rule	of	More	 than	Four”.	 	 	Moreover,	constitutional	protections	 for	 judicial	 independence	not	only	fail	to	preclude	such	manipulation,	but	can	themselves	be	exploited	for	even	greater	effect.	See	supra	note	15	
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rather than the ends. The courts indeed manifest important institutional characters in 
judicialized process96.  
 
Importantly, the purpose of guiding cases, according to the SPC, is to provide reference for 
all Chinese courts when they encounter similar cases in future, and to better solve the 
problem of disunited judgements in the diverse China97. However, this has somewhat led to 
the ambiguous status of the binding effects of guiding cases. Although the SPC claim that the 
practice of guiding case is not intended to duplicate the stare decisis system in Common Law 
world98. They do, to a varied degree, has provided de facto precedent-effect for courts to 
observe. Indeed, even viewing from limited information we have, there are indeed some 
cases have already cited the guiding cases. For example, after the Guiding Case No.10 was 
issued by the SPC in 2012, there have been five judgments officially refer to Guiding Case 
No.1099 . Nevertheless, we may not be optimistic too soon because the Chinese judicial 
system still formally remains in its constitutional and political cage100. Among constraints, 
the legislative supremacy and the niche of court in a civil-law legal system are two largest 
obstacles for genuine and official realization of binding effect of guiding cases.  
 
4.2.4 Law as the Strongest Weapon for Pursuing Institutional Purposes 
 
                                                96	In	 addition,	 we	 need	 to	 clarify	 relationship	 between	 judicial	 rulemaking	 and	 judicialization.	 These	 two	 concepts	 are	 different	terms	having	several	aspects	overlapped.		The	key	is,	rule-making	generally	contain	varied	degree	of	judicialization,	because	judicial	rule-making	 is	 the	 courts	 make	 abstract	 rules	 that	 conquer	 a	 new	 realm	 and	 bind	 the	 similar	 dyadic	 exchange	 and	 normative	structure	in	future.		97	This	 has	 been	 officially	 acknowledged	 by	 the	 SPC.	 See,	 for	 example,	 “Zuigaorenminfayuan	 fabu	 jiaqiang	 anli	 zhidaogongzuo	qingkuang”	(June	12,	2015),	SPC,	online:	<http://www.court.gov.cn/zixun-xiangqing-14623.html>	98	At	best,	 “the	system	of	stare	decisis	is	only	used	 for	 reference.”	Said	by	Shen	Deyong,	Standing	Vice-President	of	SPC.	See	 “Shen	Deyong:	 Strengthening	 Guiding	 Case	 and	 Unify	 the	 standard	 for	 judgment”	 (Sept.	 16,	 2015),	 SPC,	online:<http://www.court.gov.cn/zixun-xiangqing-15475.html>	99	There	are	five	results	for	searching	“Guiding	Case	Referenced:	Guiding	Case	No.10”,	See	the	Search	on	Chian	Guiding	Cases	Project,	Stanford	Law	School,	online:		<https://cgc.law.stanford.edu/judgments/?guiding_case_references=1446>	100	See	 Court	 in	 Transition,	 supra	note	 82	 at	 71,	 77,	 99-100;	 Anthony	 R.	 Dicks,	 “Compartmentalized	 Law	 and	 Judicial	 Restraint”	(1995)	The	China	Quarterly,	No.	141,	Special	Issue:	China's	Legal	Reforms	82	at	86-87;	see	also	supra	note	31	at	256	
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Indeed, both our theoretical framework and empirical examination of guiding cases 
demonstrated that, law, or normative structure, is the most powerful weapon in courts’ 
arsenal for pursuing both institutional/self-interest and preferring values. From our 
exploration of guiding cases, we could also testify such assumption. “Court are law’s courts”. 
In numbers of guiding cases, law has been turned into reasoning and persuasion. In taking 
advantage of legislative blank, the PRC courts mainly go through legal reasoning and legal 
logic to provide necessity to themselves, as many guiding cases above have shown. 
 
On the other hand, while court pursue public policy and institutional interest at the expense of 
other administrative branches, it may also do so by covering with legal shield. As we could 
see from nearly all administrative litigations, they all first tend to review legality (hefaxing). 
In performing legalism review, courts in general review whether the disputed act has violated 
laws or legal order. Courts in these cases cast as neutral dispute resolvers and law-interpreters 
in order to invisibly pursue institutional interests and preferring policies. Perhaps one of the 
most important example would be Guiding Case No.5, where the court, in an administrative 
case, took the opportunity to create a system of quasi-constitutional review, a taboo in current 
China constitutional and political system. And to make things more interesting, the case was 
selected by the SPC as a guiding case. Thus, in short, the fact that normative structure 
become the most powerful weapon for courts to serve self-institutional interests and 
preferring values have empirically confirmed our institutional analytic model of courts in 
China’s context. 
 
4.2.5 Institutional Purposes in Criminal, Civil and Administrative Cases 
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In general, we have found that the degree that institutional purposes reflect in civil, criminal 
and administrative cases are different among all guiding cases. Obviously in different types 
of cases, the room for Chinese court to pursue their institutional purposes are varied. 
 
In civil cases, frequently the disputes only involve private parties such as individuals and 
companies. In this sense, courts thus usually only have to deal with society in many civil 
cases. This is indeed put Chinese courts in a more comfort zone since the court is not only a 
TDR institution, but a government institutions. As government institutions, courts share 
coercive power backed up by the state. Thus, we have found that Chinese Courts in these 
cases have much autonomy to demonstrate their preferring policies and pursue 
self/institutional interests without concerning political safety related to more sensitive cases, 
or possible retaliation caused by stepping on other institutions’ realm. Furthermore, in many 
circumstances, they may care more about their preferring values rather than, say, judge’s self-
interests in many of these cases.  
 
Secondly and astonishingly, while basic facts or disputes of most administrative cases are 
quite straightforward, a large part of administrative cases among all guiding cases reflect 
strong institutional purposes. This is first because most administrative cases collected as 
guiding cases involve salient judicialized process where the courts started to handle disputes 
previously were not under its remits in order to expand its reviewing scope. Secondly, as we 
could see from these cases, many preferring values are achieved through striking down 
administrative acts or taking advantage of legislative gap in administrative cases. For 
example, the Guiding Cases No.5 where the court established a potentially quasi-
constitutional review power is an typical administrative case. Thus, in short, apart from civil 
cases, administrative cases provided another arena where the courts expanding judicial power 
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and display their preferring values. 
 
Third, in criminal cases, the courts indeed have the least room for stretch their 
self/institutional interests and preferring values. As we could see from guiding cases, 
traditional values often prevail in criminal cases, although the court may still pursue some 
values or extend institutional power in these cases just as the Guiding Case No. 61 has 
revealed. This may cause by at least three reasons: first, courts in most criminal cases directly 
perform social control function for the state power. The State and legislation may only leave 
a very limited room for courts to stretch themselves in criminal cases. Second, as criminal 
procedure in elsewhere, the principle of Chinese criminal law also stresses modest and 
restrained application of criminal code, which has further limit the room of the courts. Third, 
in China legal system, the criminal law generally involves three state organs: The Public 
Security Bureau (Police), procuratorate and the courts. Traditionally the police and 
procuratorate enjoy higher status in Chinese context, plus the Political-Legal Committee’s 
strong influence. Under such circumstance, in most cases the courts seldom challenge the 
procuratorate and polices in criminal justice, which may further limit its capacity to display 
and pursue its own agenda.  
 
4.2.6 The “Uprising” Character in Local PRC Courts 
 
From these guiding cases, we could particularly notice that many bold judgments that rule 
fiercely against government department and fill in legislative gap are delivered by lower 
courts, especially court in basic level and intermediate level. For example, the Guiding Case 
No. 26 was the case where a basic court struck down an administrative act of provincial 
government department. In Guiding Case No.5, the potential power for quasi-constitutional 
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review was established by a basic court, where the reasoning of this judgment de facto 
challenge the validity and legality of the Measure that issued by a department of provincial 
government.   
 
Therefore, the scenario is interesting because it is actually counter-intuitive, challenging our 
perception regarding authoritarian judicial system like the PRC courts that work under great 
pressure from both the authoritarian environment which hostile to judicial independence, 
judicial activism, and bureaucratic tradition. Why basic courts in China willing to risk 
themselves to challenge the state power? Indeed, Blame’s article in basic rural tribunals in 
Western China may inspire us for answering this question. She found that, comparing with 
courtroom, free from rigidity and formality in tribunal makes it easier to develop popular 
constitutionalism in current China 101 . Nevertheless, obviously degree of rigidity and 
formality seems to be an inadequate explanation for phenomenon we found in here. Thus, 
such scenario is worth to be further explored and more answers may be needed. 
 
4.2.7 Guiding Cases and Hyper-political Cases 
 
As indicated by our case categorization, we divide all cases in China into ordinary cases, 
sensitive cases and hyper-political cases. We have theorized that institutional characters in all 
three categories of cases in PRC authoritarian context are different. For the characteristics 
and extent of institutional in each category, we also assume that they are varied, although 
they share important institutional logics in common.  In the second and third part of this 
article, from empirical data we have drawn from guiding case system and selected hyper-
political case, we found that, in general, in ordinary Cases Chinese courts mainly pursue 
                                                101	Stephanie	Balme,	“Ordinary	Justice	and	Popular	Constitutionalism	in	China”,	in	Stephanie	Balme	&	Michael	Dowdle,	eds,	Building	
Constitutionalism	in	China	(New	York:	Paggrave	Macmillan,	2009)	179	at	195-196	
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preferring values, while in hyper-political cases institutional integrity and normative values, 
as well as self-interest of judge dominate institutional purposes of PRC courts. 
 
If we view only these judgments alone, we might make a reckless conclusion that Chinese 
courts act not much different than courts in Europe, North America or even Japan or South 
Korea. Chinese courts act like a very well-established court that chose preferring public 
policy with total discretionary power, as long as the courts stay within the line of the law. The 
courts even forfeit the chance to expand its own power toward the society even though it 
totally has the opportunity to do so.   
 
However, this scenario become quite different once we take hyper-political cases into 
account. When adjudicating cases involving hyper-political matter, Chinese courts’ 
fundamental “crisis of TDR legitimacy” has been exacerbated. When this occur, the channel 
for pursuing most preferring values would be generally closed. And the only option left for 
PRC courts is to use varies tactics to statically defend its institutional nature and integrity. 
Thus, protecting the image of neutral dispute resolver remain as central task for PRC courts 
as institution, although in occasion they may be able to declare limited normative policy or 
even engage in somewhat constitutional arguments. 
  
4.2.8 The Limitations of Guiding Cases 
 
As we have demonstrated institutional purposes manifested in China’s Guiding Case system, 
there are at least two major limitations of these guiding cases.  
 
First, as they have been ascribed into the category of “ordinary justice”, most, if not all 
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guiding cases selected by both lower courts and SPC stay in politically safe realm, which 
means they never touch the core of Party/State or authoritarian rule. Obviously, for example, 
none of these guiding cases involve high-ranking official, let alone more sensitive issue such 
as Communist Party, election and other more central political power. Even though a few of 
these cases seems to touch the constitutional rights such as due procedure and academic 
freedom, they are still far from “sensitiveness” if using our theoretical model aforementioned. 
For one reason, the Party, along with many political matters, are currently nonjudiciable in 
Chinese courts. However, a more fundamental reason is that the court system in China seems 
to have an intrinsic tendency to keep distance from authoritarian ruler. Of course, they have 
further confirmed our observation regarding institutional and self-interests of Chinese courts.  
This means PRC courts have incentives to preserve self-interest of judges and protect the 
institutional health of the courts by staying away from political disputes. Importantly, 
remaining as a low-key neutral TDR institution, an “apolitical” dispute resolver in 
adjudicating activities is beneficial to development of judicial power in current China context.  
 
Another major limitation of guiding case system is selection bias problem. As we discussed 
above, all guiding cases are handpicked by courts, thus they might limit our perception of the 
whole picture of courts and justices in China. Even within the realm of ordinary justice, the 
guiding cases are questionable regarding their representativeness of whole cases. Indeed, in a 
country bearing vast regional difference, guiding cases by no means represent every single 
judgement in every courtroom in over three thousand Chinese courts102. The nature of twice-
selection of guiding cases may blind us to see how similar cases are decided even in a basic 
court in an adjacent town. Moreover, a more frustrated fact is that, in current China, false 
                                                102	For	instance,	in	2016,	official	statistics	show	there	are	over	23	million	cases	handling	by	PRC	courts,	18%	more	than	total	cases	in	2015.	 “Works	 Report	 of	 SPC”	 (March	 19,	 2017)	 Xinhuanet,	 online:<http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2017-03/19/c_1120653949.htm>	
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case and judicial corruption remains as very serious but common problem103, and this has 
further impaired the trustworthiness that guiding cases could represent the real scenario in 
China. Nevertheless, guiding cases do show many excellent judgments genuinely and bravely 
delivered by Chinese judges. Also, because they have been collected and organized by the 
SPC functioning as reference cases, it might show a path regarding where Chinese courts 
might go in the near future. 
 
5. Conclusion 
After briefly introducing institutional perspective, this article has proposed a new analytic 
framework to interpret institutional purposes of courts in PRC authoritarian context. This 
theory implies that the foundation of judicial development growth in China lies in courts’ 
basic nature as TDR institution but not rest on external factors. As one major pillar of the 
comprehensive institutional analytic framework, this article has first provided a theoretical 
model indicating that PRC courts do pursue a variety of institutional purpose just as courts in 
elsewhere.  
 
We have adopted the rational/utilitarian perspective and divide institutional purposes 
according to principle of appropriateness and principle of consequentiality. On the one hand, 
we have identified common vital self-interests of judges, and courts’ institutional interest to 
increase professionalism to attain more power and enhance socio-politico status. On the other 
hand, this article also suggests that court as institution have the tendency to pursue preferring 
values and public policies.  
 
                                                103	See,	 for	 example,	 Fu	 Hualing,	 “Building	 Judicial	 Integrity	 in	 China”	 (2016)	 39:1	Hastings International and Comparative Law 
Review 167 
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We use the guiding cases system collected and issued by the SPC to test our theoretical 
framework. With hyper-political cases as contrast, we have found these guiding cases seems 
to be able to validate our institutional analytic model. First, while the cases are farthest from 
the core interest of authoritarian rule, the court enjoy largest autonomy to pursue its own 
preferring values and policies that the court(s) found desirable. Chinese courts, on its own, 
could choose to implement substantial public policy, or uphold the normative values to 
promote institutional interests. It could choose to expand its own territory by judicializing 
social-economic affairs, or develop its authority at the expanse of administrative branches in 
administrative litigations. It may follow a common and even institutionalized approach to fill 
in the legislative blank left by the NPC. At its extreme, the courts may establish a quasi-
constitutional review power in ordinary cases. The courts, in other words, deploy a potential 
powerful weapon without immediately activating it. On the one hand, guiding cases reflect, 
though rarely, the self-interest of courts. Also, many cases reflect strong tendency of self-
empower of PRC courts, and many of these cases demonstrate high degree of normative 
preference that PRC courts use law to increase their own power and authority. On the other 
hand, in numbers of guiding cases, the courts may choose to cooperate in preserving 
traditional values, promoting policies that reflected strong traditional and Socialist values. 
However, in many other cases, PRC courts are enthusiastic to pursue activist values that at 
the expanse of administrative authority, or take advantage of legislative blank, or directly 
control the public policy of Chinese society. Furthermore, in some rare occasions, PRC 
courts even scarify their opportunities to self-empower in exchange of preserving social 
autonomy, a special preferring value. Furthermore, guiding cases also manifest some 
interesting scenario. For example, it has shown that local courts’ uprising character against 
high level governments, and the extent of manifestation of institutional purposes are varied in 
criminal, civil and administrative cases. 
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Indeed, comparing with courts in elsewhere, institutional purposes of SPC and lower Chinese 
courts demonstrate in guiding cases are not much different from many counterparties in the 
world. Courts perform important TDR, social control and legislative function, and they all 
have different level of self/institutional interests and preferring values and public policy. 
 
Perhaps most importantly is that guiding cases had been selected by both lower courts and the 
SPC, as an official “reference” for similar cases will be tried by Chinese courts in the future. 
In a sense, they are “endorsed” by the SPC. And the list of guiding cases is growing every 
three months continuingly. No one could predict or accurately examine how much impact 
these guiding cases could make to the current China judicial system which come with huge 
regional diversity across the country, but high-quality judgments made by the Chinese courts 
are by no means limited to these SPC guiding cases. Every year millions of judgments of 
ordinary cases had been delivered by over three thousand PRC courts, and there are always 
treasures to be discovered.  
 
Nevertheless, as we have also noted, there are significant limitation for examining 
institutional purposes of Chinese courts through guiding cases system. Not only guiding cases 
has ruled out the sensitive cases and hyper-political cases in China, but they even are also 
insufficient to reveal the whole picture of ordinary justices in China. Moreover, selection bias 
inherited from the selection process of guiding cases has further limited the empirical validity 
of guiding cases system. 
 
